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Abstract
We derive an econometric test for the presence of monotone comparative statics in
models with multiple equilibria. The test applies to many economic models, such as
single-person decision, industrial organization, macroeconomic and game-theory models.
These models have complementarities between exogenous and endogenous variables. We
show that, as a result, extreme (large and small) conditional quantiles of the endoge-
nous variable are increasing in the exogenous variable. We develop a likelihood-ratio test
based on estimates for the conditional quantiles of the endogenous variable, which is an
asymptotic extension of Bartholomew’s (1959a,b) “chi-bar squared” test. Our assump-
tions are weak; we remain agnostic about the cardinality, location and probabilities of
the equilibrium set, and make no restrictions on the equilibrium-selection procedure.
JEL classification numbers: C1,C5
Key words: Econometrics of Games, Monotone Comparative Statics, Quantile Regres-
sion
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1 Introduction
Comparative statics predictions—how exogenous variables affect endogenous variables—
are important to establish in economic models. Often, the models possess multiple equi-
libria, which poses severe challenges for establishing such comparative statics predic-
tions, not to mention testing them econometrically. The standard practice is to impose
additional assumptions, so that the model has a unique equilibrium. These additional
assumptions are often very strong, and independent of the desired economic explanation.
When there are complementarities between exogenous and endogenous variables, de-
spite the possible presence of multiple equilibria, a “monotone comparative statics” pre-
diction holds: There is a smallest and a largest equilibrium, and these change mono-
tonically with exogenous variables. In this paper, we show how monotone comparative
∗Acknowledgments: Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at Northwestern University,
UC Berkeley, UC Davis, the North American ES summer meeting, the EEE2005 conference, and the
2005 ESSET workshop. Many thanks to Andre´s Aradillas-Lo´pez, Patrick Bajari, Peter Bossaerts, Chris
Chambers, Xiaohong Chen, Valentino Dardanoni, Joel Horowitz, Matt Jackson, Michael Jansson, Chuck
Manski, Andrea Mattozzi, Rosa Matzkin, Tom Palfrey, Jim Powell, Andrea Rotnitzky, Paul Ruud,
Max Stinchcombe, Andrew Sweeting, Elie Tamer, Quang Vuong, Hal White, and Bill Zame for their
suggestions and comments.
statics arguments translate into restrictions on the conditional quantiles of the endoge-
nous variable. We construct a likelihood-ratio test of such quantile restrictions. Our
test recognizes the existence of (possibly) many equilibria with unknown probabilities of
realization.
The monotone comparative statics prediction was first formulated by Milgrom and
Roberts (1994) and Villas-Boas (1997), who observed that, in many economic models,
there is a smallest and a largest equilibrium, and that these change monotonically with
exogenous variables. We illustrate their insight, and how we build on it, using a simple
example: we discuss comparative statics in the Solow growth model. Let f be the pro-
duction function, s the savings rate, δ the depreciation rate, and n the rate of population
growth in a closed economy. The Solow model determines capital per worker, k, from the
equilibrium condition: sf(k) = (n + δ)k. The endogenous variable is then k. We shall
disregard the always-present trivial equilibrium, k = 0.
If f exhibits increasing returns, hence is not strictly concave, one typically obtains
multiple equilibria—see Figure 1. The literature on growth has emphasized the impor-
tance of increasing returns, but growth models avoid multiple equilibria by very specific
assumptions on the form of increasing returns (e.g. the “AK model”). One must then
wonder if the sole notion of increasing returns is sufficient to generate the literature’s
explanations. If it is not sufficient, the literature is fundamentally flawed.
Consider Figure 1. When f1 is the production function, the equilibria are k1, k2,
and k3. If we change the production function to f2, the set of equilibria changes to k
′
1,
k′2, k
′
3, k
′
4 and k
′
5: the largest and the smallest equilibrium have increased. An increase
in education, making the economy more productive, might lead to such a change in f .
The Solow growth model then predicts that an exogenous increase in education causes an
increase in capital, as long as one looks at the extreme equilibria. This is the monotone
comparative statics prediction.
Now consider a researcher testing the hypothesis that an increase in education leads
to more capital, using cross-country data on education and income. Assume that all the
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Figure 1: Solow model.
countries in such a data-set can be sorted into two groups: low-education countries with
production function f1, and high-education countries with f2. The researcher assumes
that the prediction about extremal equilibria in Figure 1 holds. She, however, ignores the
number of equilibria, their true values and the corresponding probabilities. For example,
the true equilibrium distribution could be the one in Figure 2.
Figure 2 shows two sets of equilibria, one for each f . There are Gaussian-like densi-
ties around each equilibrium, which reflects that an equilibrium is observed imprecisely.
If equilibrium k1 is selected, we may observe a deviation from k1 due to, for example,
short-run fluctuations around equilibrium, (unobserved) heterogeneities across different
countries, or measurement error. We shall reflect our uncertainty about equilibrium se-
lection, and deviations from equilibrium, by using the mixture form depicted in Figure 2.
The case in Figure 2 presents a challenge for our researcher. Note that (a) the largest
equilibrium in the low-education group, and the low equilibria in the high-education
group have high probabilities; (b) the largest equilibrium in the high-education group
has low probability; and (c) three relatively small and likely equilibria appear in the
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high-education countries. Were our researcher to compute the mean income in both
groups, she should expect it to be smaller in the high education group. Of course, one
can find equilibrium distributions for which the conclusion is reversed, and the mean of
highly-educated countries is larger. In other words, there are no testable implications for
the conditional mean of income.
Note that, in the example of Figure 1, the middle equilibrium (k2) is unstable. Every-
thing we say holds, including the negative statements about testing using mean income,
if one ignores unstable equilibria. We would need a more complicated picture, with more
than three equilibria, to make our point.
What makes the testing problem a priori difficult is that the researcher has little
knowledge of what is the true equilibrium distribution: she does not know the number of
equilibria in each case, their values, or their corresponding probabilities.
Our solution is to impose the right structure on the tails of probability distributions
around each equilibrium such that the effect of k3 < k
′
5 (and k1 < k
′
1) is eventually
reflected in some large enough quantile of k. Hence, the researcher should compare some
(sufficiently high) quantile of the income in two groups, in order to test the hypothesis of
interest. In the problems we consider, then, quantile-based analysis—and not traditional
mean-based methods—is the proper econometric methodology. Specifically, we derive a
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Figure 2: Equilibrium distributions.
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likelihood-ratio test for the type of monotone comparative statics exemplified in Figure 1.
It is important to stress that we make few assumptions on the true equilibrium dis-
tribution. We only assume that the extremal equilibria have strictly positive probability
(alternatively, the test is that the extremal equilibria, of those with positive probability,
depend monotonically on the exogenous variables). Similarly, our assumptions on the
distribution tails are weak; we need them to belong to a well-known class of distribu-
tions in extreme-value theory. This class includes most distributions commonly used in
empirical work, such as Gaussian, lognormal and exponential distributions.
We now briefly comment on the scope of our contributions. First, our methods
apply to many economic models. Some examples are: single-person decision models, IO
models (such as Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly, markets with differentiated products),
macroeconomic models, growth models, and game-theory models. We provide a more
detailed description of these models and how they enter into our setup in Section 2.2.
In particular, we note that a more modern version of the Solow model, with optimizing
agents, would also fall into our framework.
Second, we show that standard econometric methods, which focus on the mean of
the endogenous variable, are not suited for testing in the presence of multiple equilibria.
Researchers should instead use quantile-based econometric methods. From a practical
view-point, our testing methods are readily taken to data. They build on the extensive
literature on quantile-based econometric methods which are today well-understood and
easy to use in practice.
Finally, the results of the paper give an economic justification for quantile-based
econometric methods. Work on these methods has so far been justified by the—reasonable
but limited—idea that one should look for richer aspects of the conditional distribution of
endogenous variables, beyond the conditional mean.1 Our results imply that, in models
with multiple equilibria, one must use quantile-based econometric methods: these models
cannot be tested within the classical mean regression framework.
1Chernozhukov and Hong (2004) is an exception.
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Related Literature As early as in the work of Bjorn and Vuong (1984, 1985), econo-
metricians recognized the importance of testing economic models that possess multiple
equilibria. Proposed solutions to the problem of multiplicity of equilibria have been to
assume the probabilities of various equilibrium realizations known (Bjorn and Vuong,
1984); or finitely parametrized (Bjorn and Vuong, 1985; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995;
Bajari, Hong, and Ryan, 2004; Sweeting, 2005). With a model for the equilibrium selec-
tion rule in hand, likelihood based estimation and inference is feasible even when multiple
equilibria are present. The validity of the results, however, will depend crucially on the
correct specification of the equilibrium selection model. Unfortunately, economic theory
provides little guidance on how to model equilibrium selection; there is a large body of
work on equilibrium selection, but no widely accepted theory.
When no model for the equilibrium selection rule is available, there are alternative
approaches to estimation and inference. The first exploits the fact that—despite the
multiplicity—some of the model features are uniquely predicted; by focusing attention
on those features, one is then able to carry out likelihood-based estimation and inference.
Observable implications in models with multiple equilibria were first derived by Jovanovic
(1989) who sought conditions for point identification. A number of recent papers in the
(quickly expanding) literature on econometrics of games further carry out estimation in
such models (Bresnahan and Reiss, 1990, 1991; Berry, 1992; Tamer, 2003). With no sim-
ple point-identification conditions available, there is a second approach to estimation and
inference. In a variety of economic models studied, the parameters of interest typically
satisfy a set of inequality constraints—in addition to the standard equilibrium equality
constraints—that one may exploit for set identification (Andrews, Berry, and Jia, 2004;
Ciliberto and Tamer, 2004; Kim, 2005).
Mostly, the above papers build on discrete-choice methods and typically try to esti-
mate agents’ payoff functions (i.e. estimate the nature of strategic interaction); not only
test for the presence of a comparative-statics effect. Understandably, they make more
parametric assumptions than we do.
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The existing methods are also well-suited for models with few choice variables, as
they build on the theory of discrete-choice models. Our methods are the first that apply
to models with continuous endogenous variables. Later in the paper we point out some
additional differences.
Finally, we note that Athey and Stern (1998) discuss tests for monotone comparative
statics. They study firms’ choice of organizational form; they do not address equilibrium
problems.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We introduce the model in Sec-
tion 2, and present the intuition behind our main results in Section 3. In Section 4
we present the basic statistical framework, and develop an approach to estimation in
Section 5. Finally, in Section 6 we present our test.
2 Setup
We shall first introduce our model and some basic notation. We then show that our
model is general enough to accommodate many existing economic models, and that the
econometric structure allows for some common specifications.
2.1 Reduced-form model
Let T ⊆ Rn be a finite set, and ≤ be the usual partial order on Rn. A reduced-form
model is a collection ((Et, pt), t ∈ T ) such that:
1. for all t, Et ⊆ R++ is finite and nonempty;
2. t < t′ implies that min Et < min Et′ and max Et < max Et′ ;
3. for all t, pt(·) is a probability distribution over Et such that pt(min Et) > 0 and
pt(max Et) > 0.
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Interpret T as the exogenous variable, T as the set of possible values it can take, and
Et as the set of predictions (equilibria) to be tested when T takes value t ∈ T . The set
Θ = ∪t∈T Et is the set of all possible equilibrium outcomes as t varies in T . The elements
of Θ are denoted θ.
The probability distribution pt(·) reflects some equilibrium-selection procedure. Our
results shall build on the comparative statics in item (2) of the definition. We show below
how the predictions of a number of economic models satisfy (2). The assumption on pt(·)
in item (3) is harder to justify; we discuss it in Section 2.4.
We shall use the notation θ¯t = max Et and θt = min Et.
2.2 Economic models
Many economic models imply our reduced-form model. If a model’s equilibria are the
zeroes, or the fixed points, of a function that depends monotonically on t, then it implies
our reduced-form model (Milgrom and Roberts (1994) first made this point, and provided
examples).
Following are some examples of well-known models that imply our reduced-form
model. We show how the models satisfy the definition of a reduced-form model, ex-
cept for the requirement that Et is finite. Standard arguments from differential topology
imply a generically finite number of equilibria, zeroes or fixed points, in our applications. 2
2.2.1 Individual decision maker.
Consider models of individual decision making, in which the endogenous variable is one-
dimensional, and determined as the first-order condition of an optimization problem.
Examples are investment-choices by firms and labor-decisions by individuals. Our meth-
ods can be used for testing if investment is sensitive to Tobin’s q, as in Hayashi (1982)
2On the other hand, we believe our methods can be extended to accommodate infinite Et.
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and Hayashi and Inoue (1991)), or for testing the effect of wages on labor-participation,
as in Juhn (1992).
The most important applications in this category are market-equilibrium models
that one solves as a social-planning problem. Thus, many growth and macroeconomic
models—such as the ones in Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2003), and Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2004)—fall into our framework. For example, a version of the Solow model we discussed
in the introduction, but with optimizing agents like in Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2003),
and increasing returns, is within our framework.
To see how the models with an individual decision maker reduce to the model in
Section 2.1, interpret g(θ, t) = 0 as a first-order condition, where t is a parameter and θ
is the equilibrium. So, if g(θ, t) is increasing in t, A ⊆ R+ is compact, g : A× T → R is
continuous, g(inf A, t) > 0 and g(sup A, t) ≤ 0, then
Et = {θ ∈ A : g(θ, t) = 0} ,
has the properties described in Section 2.1. Note that the last two assumptions on g
are weak “boundary” conditions; they are satisfied if Inada conditions are satisfied. No
additional assumptions on the form of g are needed. Hence, our methods allow one to test
individual decision making models under rather general assumptions on the individual’s
objective functions.
2.2.2 One-dimensional equilibrium.
Examples of equilibrium models with a one-dimensional endogenous variable are easy to
find. For example, in a two-player game, we can compose the two players’ best-response
functions and reduce it to our model. As a consequence, duopoly models generally reduce
to our reduced-form. Cournot n-firm oligopoly models also reduce to a one-dimensional
equilibrium model by an aggregation procedure (Amir, 1996; Amir and Lambson, 2000).
One can thus test, for example, if entry of additional firms to a market causes a decrease
in prices (Amir and Lambson, 2000).
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Additional examples include some overlapping-generations models, such as the one
in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), and two-good general equilibrium models (in fact by
interpreting g(θ, t) = 0 as a zero excess-demand condition in the previous subsection).
To see why the one-dimensional equilibrium models reduce to the model in Section 2.1,
interpret the fixed-point condition g(θ, t) = θ as an equilibrium condition. So,
Et = {θ ∈ A : g(θ, t) = θ} , (1)
with g(θ, t) continuous, increasing in t, and A ⊆ R++ compact, fits our reduced-form
model (see e.g. Milgrom and Shannon (1994)).
Since our results apply to two-player games, they apply to many models in the litera-
ture on the econometrics of games, e.g. Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991); Berry (1992);
Tamer (2003); Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2004) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2004).
2.2.3 Multi-dimensional equilibrium.
Equilibrium models with a multidimensional endogenous variable fall into our framework,
as long as there are complementarities among the different dimensions of the endogenous
variable. Thus, games of strategic complementarities (Topkis, 1979; Vives, 1990; Milgrom
and Roberts, 1990) reduce to the model in Section 2.1.
These games include many economic models of interest. For example, price-competition
in the—arguably—most common market structure: Bertrand competition with differen-
tiated products (e.g. we could test for some of the effects in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes
(1995)). They also include macroeconomic models of coordination failures, models of two
sided matching, and Hart and Moore’s property-rights model. Topkis (1998) and Vives
(1999) contain many more examples.
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2.3 Econometric model
A statistical reduced-form model is a collection
((Et, pt, (Hθ,t)θ∈Et) , t ∈ T )
such that
1. ((Et, pt), t ∈ T ) is a reduced-form model,
2. for all t ∈ T and θ ∈ Et, Hθ,t(·) is a twice-differentiable distribution function on
R++, with strictly positive density.
The model should be interpreted as follows: the endogenous variable X is distributed,
given T = t, as Ft(·) ≡ F (·|T = t), where Ft(·) is a discrete mixture of continuous
distributions,
Ft(x) =
∑
θ∈Et
pt(θ)Hθ,t(x/θ) for any x > 0. (2)
The assumptions on Hθ,t(·) imply that, for any t in T , Ft(·) is twice differentiable on
R++, and that ft(·) ≡ F ′t (·) > 0 on R++. To alleviate the notation, we shall drop the
reference to t whenever possible.
Given α ∈ (0, 1), let qt(α) denote the α-quantile under Ft(·),
qt(α) ≡ inf{y ∈ R++ : Ft(y) > α}. (3)
Under our assumptions, the quantity in Equation (3) is well defined, and qt(α) = F
−1
t (α).
In what follows, we devote particular attention to the distribution tails of the endoge-
nous variable: F¯t(·) ≡ 1− Ft(·). Similarly, we let H¯θ,t(·) ≡ 1−Hθ,t(·). Note that given t
in T and for any α ∈ (0, 1), we have the following simple relation:
qt(α) = F¯
−1
t (1− α). (4)
2.4 On the model assumptions
We now comment on the restrictions we have made in our statistical reduced-form model.
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2.4.1 Mixture assumptions
We do not make any specific assumptions regarding the origin of the mixture distribution
in (2). This preserves the generality of our approach. We note however that familiar
classes of econometric error models imply the mixture model for Ft(·). It is implied, in
particular, when conditional on T = t, the observations come from a multiplicative model
X ≡ θ · ε, (5)
where θ ∈ Et is an equilibrium, drawn according to pt(·) and ε is a multiplicative “er-
ror”, drawn from distribution Hθ,t(·). This multiplicative structure has the advantage of
preserving the non-negativity of the endogenous variable; however, it is not crucial, and
one can work with a linear model by performing a logarithmic transformation.
Depending on the application, the “error” variable ε in Equation (5) can have different
interpretations. For example, in labor-economic studies based on individuals’ reported
earnings (Bound, Brown, Duncan, and Rodgers, 1994), ε can be thought of as a mea-
surement error; it can arise when θ is measured relative to an equivalence scale which
is itself measured inaccurately. In game-theoretic models ε corresponds to a behavioral
error, as in models of Quantal Response Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). In
the Solow growth model, ε may be interpreted as a short-term fluctuation around a
long-term steady state θ.3
In classical error models, it is assumed that ε is independent of θ, as well as all
other variables. In some applications, these assumptions may be justified, but in others
they are merely convenient (e.g. see Chen, Hong, and Tamer (2005) for an excellent
discussion). In the labor literature, for example, there is well-established evidence against
the independence assumption (Bound, Brown, Duncan, and Rodgers, 1994). We allow
for arbitrary dependence between the exogenous variable T , the equilibrium θ, and the
3Note that the “no error” case in which the equilibria θ are observed without error, corresponds to
having Hθ,t(x) = 1I(x 6 θ) for any x > 0, where the function 1I(·) is the indicator function: for any
event A, we have 1I(A) = 1 if A true and 1I(A) = 0 otherwise. To avoid complications arising from the
non-differentiability of Ft(·), we do not formally treat this case.
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error ε. For example, errors are allowed to be correlated with θ and/or to be conditionally
heteroskedastic (see Section 4.4).
2.4.2 Assumptions on p
We have assumed that the largest and smallest equilibria in Et have positive probability
under pt(·)—this is our only deviation from being agnostic regarding pt(·) (one precedent
in this respect is Sweeting (2005), who assumes that all equilibria have positive proba-
bility). We actually need something somewhat weaker, and it will be clear that, without
our weaker assumption, no testable implications are possible. We argue here that our
assumption is reasonable.
To fix ideas, let T = {t, t¯} with t < t¯. We need that the largest equilibrium in Et, of
those with positive pt-probability, be smaller than the largest with positive pt¯-probability.
This is a weaker requirement than the one we have imposed above. It says that the
equilibrium-selection mechanism implicit in (pt)t∈T should have the right correlation with
respect to changes in t.
We claim that this correlation can be expected to hold: suppose agents are playing
an equilibrium in Et when the parameter changes to t¯. Then a broad class of learning
dynamics must lead them to play a larger equilibrium (Echenique (2002) contains a
proof). Alternatively, the “shift up” of g in the models in Section 2.2 makes larger
equilibria focal.
2.4.3 Assumptions on H
Our statistical reduced-form model assumes that the Hθ,t(·) are continuous distributions
with support R++. We work with unbounded support because most practitioners are
probably unwilling to assume a bounded support. Our results, however, are easy to
generalize to situations where the support of Hθ,t(·) is bounded.
We assumed the distributions Hθ,t(·) to be unknown. In some cases, it might be
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preferable to assume Hθ,t(·) known, at least up to some finite number of parameters;
in such cases, the conditional distribution of X in (2) could in principle be estimated
via maximum likelihood methods, provided the equilibrium probabilities pt(θ) are either
known or finitely parametrized. However, the presence of unknown equilibrium probabil-
ities pt(θ) in Ft(·) causes almost all the practical problems of implementation and model
estimation with maximum likelihood methods (e.g. see Carroll, Ruppert, and Stefanski
(1995)).4
2.5 On individual heterogeneity
One may be concerned about the effect of individual heterogeneity on our model. Here
we show how individual heterogeneity—whether observed or unobserved—may be built
into our reduced-form model ((Et, pt), t ∈ T ).
Suppose that in addition to the exogenous variable T , and the endogenous variable
X, there is a variable Z that affects equilibrium sets and probabilities. Let Z be the set
of its outcomes z, Z ⊆ Rm, write Et,z for the set of possible equilibria given T = t and
Z = z, and let pt,z(·) be the distribution over equilibria in Et,z. Suppose now that Z is
finite and that for each value z in Z, the largest equilibrium in Et,z with positive pt,z-
probability is increasing in t. Let Et ≡ ∪z∈ZEt,z and pt(θ) ≡
∑
z∈Z pt,z(θ)p(z) where p(·)
is a probability distribution over Z. Given that Z is finite, ((Et, pt), t ∈ T ) is a reduced-
form model and our results will apply. In a sense, what we are doing is to integrate out
Z from the problem and reduce it to the reduced-forms we can analyze.
We require the assumption that the monotone comparative statics result holds con-
ditional on Z = z so that the largest equilibrium in Et,z with positive pt,z-probability is
increasing in t, for each value of z. In the applications we can think of, this is a reasonable
assumption. For example, in the Solow model, one can let Z be the population growth,
n. Conditional on n, then, the monotone comparative statics prediction holds, and an
4Typically, both the location points of the support of θ when T = t (Et) and the probabilities attached
to them (pt) are estimated using the EM-algorithm.
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increase in t increases the extremal equilibria of k. In this case, the source of heterogene-
ity among different countries—their population growth—is observed. Letting Z be the
depreciation rate, δ, we obtain the same result; only now the countries are assumed to
be heterogeneous in their δ’s, which are not necessarily observed by the econometrician.
In the next section, we give a different example of individual heterogeneities in game-
theoretic models.
2.6 On the source of randomness
In our statistical reduced-form model, conditional on the realization of an equilibrium,
there is a random deviation from equilibrium. This is modeled in the mixture form (2)
by the H-distributions. The econometric literature in Industrial Organization includes
errors in the payoffs of the players. These errors then imply that equilibrium outcomes
are random. Examples of this approach can be found in Bresnahan and Reiss (1990),
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), Tamer (2003), Ciliberto and Tamer (2004), and Bajari,
Hong, and Ryan (2004).5 We also assume randomness in the equilibrium realization, but
it takes the form of an unknown equilibrium selection.
In our view, there are no strong reasons to prefer one approach over the other, but the
errors-in-payoffs approach presents one question: How should the different information
on the realizations of the errors be modeled ? Most authors treat the game as a complete-
information game, while others (see Aradillas-Lo´pez (2004) and Bajari and Hong (2005))
allow for incomplete information.6,7
5The literature on testing and estimation with experimental data, on the other hand, makes an
assumption similar to ours (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995).
6We note briefly that our reduced-form model allows for incomplete information, as long as we have
strategic complementarities (Vives, 1990).
7There is a literature on dynamic games of incomplete information. Ericson and Pakes (1995) is a
seminal paper; recent contributions are Aguirregabiria and Mira (2004), Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry
(2004), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2004) and Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2004). Part of this
literature deals with models with multiple equilibria. We conjecture that some of these models can be
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That said, our reduced-form model can accommodate for errors in payoffs by treating
the errors as unobserved individual heterogeneity (Section 2.5). For example, consider
a two-player game described as follows. Player i chooses a strategy, si, from some set
Si of real numbers. There is a real exogenous variable T , and two independent real
random variables, W1, and W2 that parameterize the players’ payoffs. Given T = t, and a
realization (w1, w2) of (W1,W2), Player i’s payoffs are ui(s1, s2; t, wi). Let β1(s2; t, w1) and
β2(s1; t, w2) be the players’ best-response functions, given values of t and wi. Then the
Nash equilibria of this game, are given by the fixed points of the composed best responses,
β(s; t, w1, w2) = β1(β2(s; t, w2); t, w1). Let E∗t,w1,w2 = {s ∈ S1 : s = β(s; t, w1, w2)}. Let
pt,w1,w2(·) be the distribution over equilibria in the game specified by the values (t, w1, w2);
assume that the largest equilibrium has positive probability.
Now, assume that, for s1, s
′
1 ∈ S1 with s1 < s′1, ui(s′1, s2; t, w1) − ui(s1, s2; t, w1) is
monotone increasing in t and s2.
8 For all s, and (w1, w2), t < t
′ implies β(s; t, w1, w2) <
β(s; t′, w1, w2) by standard monotone comparative statics arguments (see e.g. Milgrom
and Shannon (1994) or Topkis (1998)). Then t < t′ implies that max E∗t,w1,w2 < max E∗t′,w1,w2 ,
for all (w1, w2). Finally, let pt(·) be the distribution over Et obtained from the distribution
of (w1, w2), and the (pt,w1,w2)-distributions.
By setting Z ≡ (W1,W2) and arguing as in Section 2.5 above, we reduce a model
with errors in payoffs to our model. Admittedly, the assumption of finite support of Wi
is not standard, but we are unaware of any substantive reasons one should avoid it. An
infinite support seems to be, mostly, a convenient modeling choice. Here we use the finite
support assumption as a simple way of showing that our model can accommodate errors
in payoffs, but one can probably, with more work, allow the errors to have more general
supports.
analyzed with our techniques.
8This model reduces to Tamer’s (2003) model in the case where there are two strategies for each
player and, using Tamer’s notation, β > 0 and ∆ > 0.
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3 Nature of the problem and results
We first explain our results informally. Consider an example, building on the Solow-
model example in the introduction. Let T = {t, t¯} ⊆ R, t < t¯, where t and t¯ denote
low- and high-level education, respectively. Denoting the different equilibrium levels of
k by θ’s, let Et = {θ1, θ2, θ3} and Et¯ = {θ′1, θ′2, θ′3, θ′4, θ′5}. The situation is represented in
Figure 2.
The problem of obtaining testable implications is to say how the distributions, Ft(·)
and Ft¯(·), must differ (Ft(·) was defined in Equation (2)). All we have to work with is
that θ3 < θ
′
5 (and θ1 < θ
′
1), but the probability of the θ
′
5 equilibrium is very low, and
there are three very likely equilibria, θ′2, θ
′
3 and θ
′
4, that are smaller than both θ2 and θ3.
Note that the mean (and median) under Ft¯(·) is smaller than that under Ft(·). Thus
the conditional mean (and median) of X does not change monotonically in t. One can
change the example so the conditional mean increases instead of decreasing; thus there
are no testable implications for the conditional mean of the endogenous variable. One is
also more likely to observe a realization under Ft(·) that is larger than under Ft¯(·) than
vice versa.
Our solution to finding testable implications is to assume the right structure on the
distribution tails, so the effect of θ3 < θ
′
5 is felt for large enough values of the endogenous
variable, irrespective of the values of the corresponding probabilities pt(·) and pt¯(·). We
show how, for large enough realizations x, the distribution tails F¯t(·) ≡ 1 − Ft(·) and
F¯t¯(·) ≡ 1− Ft¯(·) must satisfy: F¯t(x) < F¯t¯(x).
Note that the tail F¯t(·) of Ft(·) is related to that of Hθ,t(·), denoted H¯θ,t(·) ≡ 1−Hθ,t(·),
via
F¯t(x) = pt(θ1)H¯θ1,t(x/θ1) + pt(θ2)H¯θ2,t(x/θ2) + pt(θ3)H¯θ3,t(x/θ3).
Then,
F¯t(x) = H¯θ3,t(x/θ3)
[
pt(θ3) + pt(θ1)
H¯θ1,t(x/θ1)
H¯θ3,t(x/θ3)
+ pt(θ2)
H¯θ2,t(x/θ2)
H¯θ3,t(x/θ3)
]
(6)
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Assume that the tails of Hθ,t(·) satisfy the following properties: for the largest equi-
librium θ3 in Et we have
lim
x→∞
H¯θ3,t(λx)
H¯θ3,t(x)
= 0, (7)
whenever λ > 1; and for any other θ, with θ < θ3, suppose that
H¯θ,t(x)
H¯θ3,t(x)
(8)
is bounded as x goes to ∞.
Property (7) requires that the tail of the distribution Hθ3,t(·) is not too heavy. As we
explain below, it is a well-known condition in the statistics of extreme values, and it is
satisfied by most distributions familiar to practitioners. Property (8), on the other hand,
ensures that H¯θ3,t(x) does not decrease towards 0 faster than H¯θ,t(x), for θ < θ3. This
property is trivially satisfied when Hθ,t(·) is independent of θ, for example.
The two properties imply that the term in brackets in Equation 6 converges to pt(θ3)
as x grows. Indeed,
H¯θ1,t(x/θ1)
H¯θ3,t(x/θ3)
=
[
H¯θ1,t(x/θ1)
H¯θ3,t(x/θ1)
]
A
[
H¯θ3,t(x/θ1)
H¯θ3,t(x/θ3)
]
B
, (9)
so that letting y = x/θ1 and λ = θ3/θ1 > 1 and using (7) we have B = H¯θ3,t(λy)/H¯θ3,t(y) →
0. Since by (8) the A term is bounded, the ratio in (9) converges to 0.
Thus,
F¯t(x) ∼ pt(θ3)H¯θ3,t(x/θ3),
as x goes to ∞ and we establish that the behavior of Ft(x) for large x is driven by θ3.
Under analogous assumptions on Hθ,t¯(·), F¯t¯(x) behaves like pt¯(θ′5)H¯θ′5,t¯(x/θ′5). Thus,
F¯t(x)
F¯t¯(x)
∼
[
pt(θ3)
pt¯(θ
′
5)
] [
H¯θ3,t(x/θ3)
H¯θ3,t(x/θ
′
5)
]
A
[
H¯θ3,t(x/θ
′
5)
H¯θ3,t¯(x/θ
′
5)
]
B
[
H¯θ3,t¯(x/θ
′
5)
H¯θ′
5
,t¯(x/θ
′
5)
]
C
. (10)
Since θ3 < θ
′
5, the assumptions on Hθ,t(·) and Hθ,t¯(·) imply that the A term goes to
0 and the C term is bounded as x grows. If, in addition, we assume that
H¯θ3,t(x)
H¯θ3,t¯(x)
(11)
18
is bounded as x goes to ∞, then the B term is bounded. So F¯t(x)/F¯t¯(x) converges to 0
irrespective of the values of pt(·) and pt¯(·). Hence, for large enough x, the tail of Ft¯(x) is
thicker than that of Ft(x); this is the essence of our testable implication.
To summarize, Statements (7), (8) (and their analogues for t¯) and (11) together ensure
that the ratio of F¯t(·) to F¯t¯(·) goes to zero. This is our testable implication: F¯t(x) < F¯t¯(x)
for x large enough. As a result, large enough population quantiles must be larger under
Ft¯(·) than under Ft(·). In the next section we show how this result generalizes.
4 Econometric Framework
A useful statistical framework to formalize the basic ideas in Section 3 is that of regularly-
varying functions. We first give some preliminary definitions, and results on regularly-
varying functions. We then exploit this theory to develop statistical tests for the models
in Section 2.
4.1 Regular Variation Theory
In this subsection only we omit the dependence of Hθ,t(·) on t and θ.
Definition 1. A distribution tail H¯ : R++ → (0, 1) is regularly varying at c, 0 6 c 6 ∞,
with index ρ, −∞ 6 ρ < ∞, denoted H¯ ∈ Rρ at c, if for λ > 0
lim
x→c
H¯(λx)
H¯(x)
= λρ. (12)
The notion of regular variation was first introduced by Karamata (1930)); see e.g.
Resnick (1987) for an exposition. When c is understood we shall often abuse notation
and write H¯ ∈ Rρ.
We focus on regular variation at c = ∞ with index ρ = −∞, denoted by R−∞ at ∞.
Most of the distributions employed in economics, such as the Gaussian, exponential and
lognormal distributions, are in R−∞ at ∞. The distributions in R−∞ at ∞ are also called
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“(−∞)-varying” or “rapidly varying.” They are moderately heavy-tailed, or light-tailed,
meaning that their tails decrease to zero faster than any power law x−α.9
Note that the special case of H¯(·) being in R−∞ at ∞ is defined by
lim
x→∞
H¯(λx)
H¯(x)
=

 0 if λ > 1∞ if λ < 1. (13)
The discussion in Section 3 should suggest that Statement (13) is a useful property. Now,
the property in Statement (13) does not control the rate at which H¯(λx)/H¯(x) converges.
By using a subclass of (−∞)-varying distribution tails, called Γ (de Haan, 1970), we can
exercise this control.
Definition 2. A distribution tail H¯(·) belongs to the class Γ, H¯ ∈ Γ, if there exists a
function a : R++ → R++ such that for λ > 0,
lim
x→∞
H¯(x + λa(x))
H¯(x)
= exp(−λ); (14)
a(·) is called the auxiliary function of H¯(·).
When H¯ ∈ Γ, one can show that a(·) can be chosen as a(·) ≡ H¯(·)/h(·) (we shall
often make this choice).
That Γ ⊆ R−∞ is a direct consequence of Theorem 1.5.1 in de Haan (1970). Examples
of distributions whose tails are in Γ are: exponential, two-parameter Gamma, Gaussian,
lognormal, and Weibull (see e.g. Embrechts, Kluppelberg, and Mikosch (1997)).
The tail properties in Equations (12) and (14) translate into similar properties for the
inverse function H¯−1 : (0, 1) → R++ (see Lemma 8) and the class of regularly varying
functions is closed under inversion. The inverses of functions in Γ, however, do not belong
to Γ but form a class called Π (de Haan, 1970, 1974).
9This implies that all the moments of a random variable with a (−∞)-varying distribution tail are
finite. Examples of distributions with ρ-varying tails, ρ > −∞, which do not have finite moments are:
(1) a stable law with index α, 0 < α < 2, for which ρ = −α; (2) a Cauchy distribution, for which ρ = −1.
Hence the use of those distributions is not permitted in our framework.
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Definition 3. A function H¯−1 : (0, 1) → R++ belongs to the class Π, H¯−1 ∈ Π, if there
exist functions b : R++ → R++ and a : R++ → R++ such that, for µ ∈ (0, 1),
lim
y↓0
H¯−1(µy)− b(y)
a(y)
= − ln µ. (15)
When H¯(·) belongs to Γ with auxiliary function a˜(·), Equation (15) holds with b(y) ≡
H¯−1(y) and a(y) ≡ a˜(H¯−1(y)).
4.2 Testable Implications: General Result
We now return to our statistical reduced-form model ((Et, pt, (Hθ,t)θ∈Et) , t ∈ T ) and im-
pose structure on the tails H¯θ¯t,t(·).
Assumption S1: Say that a statistical reduced-form model ((Et, pt, (Hθ,t)θ∈Et) , t ∈ T )
satisfies assumption S1 if, for every t ∈ T , H¯θ¯t,t(·) is in R−∞ at ∞, and
for every θ ∈ Θ with θ < θ¯t, H¯θ,t(x)
H¯θ¯t,t(x)
is bounded as x goes to ∞. (16)
We now show how the properties of the tails H¯θ¯t,t(·) translate into properties of the
tail F¯t(·) of the conditional distribution of the endogenous variable—recall that Ft(·) was
defined by Equation (2).
Lemma 1. If ((Et, pt, (Hθ,t)θ∈Et) , t ∈ T ) satisfies S1, then for every t ∈ T :
(i) F¯t(·) is in R−∞ at ∞, and F¯t(x) ∼ pt(θ¯t)H¯θ¯t,t(x/θ¯t) as x →∞;
(ii) H¯−1
θ¯t,t
(·) and F¯−1t (·) are in R0 at 0, and F¯−1t (y) ∼ θ¯tH¯−1θ¯t,t(y) as y ↓ 0.
Thus, the limit behavior of the distribution tail F¯t(·) is determined by the largest
equilibrium in Et (i.e. θ¯t) and its probability, pt(θ¯t). In the limit, the conditional quantiles
of X are proportional to the quantiles under Hθ¯t,t(·), and the constant of proportionality
equals θ¯t.
In order to generalize the argument in Section 3 we need to strengthen our assump-
tions:
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Assumption S2: Say that a statistical reduced-form model ((Et, pt, (Hθ,t)θ∈Et) , t ∈ T )
satisfies S2 if it satisfies S1 and, in addition, for every θ ∈ Θ, and
for every (t, t′) ∈ T 2 with t < t′, H¯θ¯t,t(x)
H¯θ¯t,t′(x)
is bounded as x goes to ∞. (17)
Using the above assumptions together with Lemma 1 allows us to derive our first
main result :
Theorem 2. If ((Et, pt, (Hθ,t)θ∈Et) , t ∈ T ) satisfies S2, then for any (t, t′) ∈ T 2:
(i) there is x¯ ∈ R++ such that t < t′ implies F¯t(x) < F¯t′(x) for all x > x¯;
(ii) there is α¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that t < t′ implies qt(α) < qt′(α) for all α ∈ [α¯, 1).
The idea in (i) of Theorem 2 is that, if the distribution Hθ¯t,t(·) is not too heavy-tailed,
the effect of t on the largest equilibrium in Et will eventually be noticed in the tail of
Ft(·). In a sense, there is a race between the potentially damaging effect of other θt ∈ Et,
and the effect of the largest equilibrium θ¯t. Since pt(·) is arbitrary, pt(·) can work in
favor of the other θt ∈ Et, as in Figure 2. But the (−∞)-varying condition on H¯θ¯t,t(·)
and Property (17) together guarantee that the largest θt wins the race. Hence, for large
values of x, the conditional distributions Ft(·) of the endogenous variable have tails that
increase monotonically with t, a property akin to monotonicity in first-order stochastic
dominance. Equivalently, (ii) in Theorem 2 has consequences for the quantiles of X
conditional on T = t. In the limit, the conditional quantiles of the endogenous variable
are monotone increasing in t.
4.3 Further Model Implications
Theorem 2 suggests one can use estimates of conditional quantiles under Ft(·) for testing,
but there are several difficulties. First, the theorem does not determine x¯ or α¯; it does
not identify the quantiles for which we have testable implications. Second, we need to
know the (asymptotic) distribution of the conditional quantile estimates—the key is to
derive the latter by imposing structure on the distributions Hθt,t(·) while maintaining
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our agnosticism about the pt(·) distributions. Third, given the asymptotic distributions
of estimates for quantiles under Ft(·), we need to derive a test that is not influenced by
the pt(·) distributions nor the non-extremal values in Et, for which our model makes no
predictions.
In order to deal with the asymptotics, we need to impose further structure on the
“largest” distribution tail H¯θ¯t,t(·): in addition to being (−∞)-varying, H¯θ¯t,t(·) is now
assumed to belong to the class Γ.
Assumption S3: Say that a statistical reduced-form model ((Et, pt, (Hθ,t)θ∈Et) , t ∈ T )
satisfies S3 if it satisfies S1 and, in addition, for every t ∈ T we have H¯θ¯t,t ∈ Γ with
auxiliary function aθ¯t,t(·).
This allows us to show the following results on the tails of conditional distributions
Ft(·) of the endogenous variable.
Lemma 3. If ((Et, pt, (Hθ,t)θ∈Et) , t ∈ T ) satisfies S3, then for every t ∈ T :
(i) F¯t ∈ Γ with auxiliary function at(·), at(x) = θ¯taθ¯t,t(x/θ¯t) for all x > 0;
(ii) H¯−1
θ¯t,t
(·) and F¯−1t (·) are in Π with auxiliary functions aθ¯t,t ◦ H¯−1θ¯t,t(·) and at ◦ F¯
−1
t (·)
in R0 at 0, and at(F¯−1t (y)) ∼ θ¯t aθ¯t,t(H¯−1θ¯t,t(y)) as y ↓ 0.
Lemma 3 presents two results: First, that the Γ (resp. Π) properties of H¯θ¯t,t(·) (resp.
H¯−1
θ¯t,t
(·)) continue to hold for any F¯t(·) (resp. F¯−1t (·)) provided Property (16) is satisfied.
Hence, we will only need to make assumptions on the behavior of H¯θ¯t,t(·) in Equation (2)
in order to fully characterize the behavior of F¯t(·) as x gets large. Note that this result
is particularly important if we want to preserve our agnosticism about the probabilities
pt(·) over equilibria θt.
The second result of Lemma 3 is to show how at ◦ F¯−1t (·) relates to aθ¯t,t ◦ H¯−1θ¯t,t(·).
We shall prove that these expressions are involved in the formulation of the central limit
theorem for empirical conditional quantiles under Ft(·). In other words, the results of
Lemma 3 are essential for understanding the asymptotic properties of the estimators
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for conditional quantiles of X, and hence for constructing an econometric test of the
implication derived in Theorem 2.
Before discussing in more details the questions of estimation and inference we give
a simple example, illustrating how a commonly-used set of assumptions falls into our
framework.
4.4 An Illustrative Example
All assumptions we have made about the distributions Hθ,t(·) are satisfied, for example,
in the multiplicative error model (5) with log-normal and conditionally heteroskedastic
errors. Let µθ,t : Θ × T → R and σθ,t : Θ × T → R++, and say that, conditional on
T = t and θ = θt, ln εt is normally distributed with mean µθt,t and variance σ
2
θt,t
,
ln εt|t, θt ∼ N (µθt,t, σ2θt,t).
A simple application of L’Hoˆpital’s rule shows that for any (t, θt) ∈ T × Et, the ratio
H¯θ¯t,t(λx)/H¯θ¯t,t(x) converges to 0 as x goes to ∞, i.e. that H¯θ¯t,t(·) is in R−∞ at ∞. If, in
addition, for a given realization t of the exogenous variable T , σ2θ,t increases with θ, then a
similar argument shows that the ratio in Equation (16) converges to 0, hence is bounded
as x goes to ∞. Therefore a log-normal error whose conditional variance increases with
the equilibrium level satisfies our assumption S1 .
Similarly, if for any given value of θ ∈ Θ, the variance σ2θ,t increases with t, then
the ratio in Equation (16) converges to 0 and it therefore bounded as x goes to ∞. In
other words a log-normal error whose conditional variance is increasing in both t and θ
satisfies our assumption S2. A simple model for the conditional variance that satisfies
this requirement is, for example, that of linear heteroskedasticity: σθ,t = κtθ, where
κt > 0 is such that κt < κt′ as long as t < t
′. Note that no restrictions are imposed on
the conditional mean µθ,t of the log-error.
10
10In particular we do not need to assume µθt,t+σ
2
θt,t
/2 = 0 which would guarantee that E(ln εt|t, θt) =
1. The latter restriction is a type of identification condition we would impose, were we to estimate say
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It is a well-known result that the log-normal family belongs to the class Γ of distribu-
tions and that their auxiliary functions are of the form aθ,t(x) = σ
2
θ,tx/
(
ln x− µθ,t
)
(see
e.g. Resnick (1987), Embrechts, Kluppelberg, and Mikosch (1997)); hence, any log-normal
error model that satisfies S1 will also satisfy our assumption S3.
5 Estimation
5.1 Notation and Setup
Consider a random sample (Xt,1, ..., Xt,Nt) of size Nt from a distribution function Ft(·),
with t ∈ T . Let (xt,1, ..., xt,Nt) denote the realizations of (Xt,1, ..., Xt,Nt) and write Fˆt,Nt(·)
to be the empirical distribution function, Fˆt,Nt(y) ≡ N−1t
∑Nt
k=1 1I(xt,k 6 y) for y > 0.
For a given α, 0 < α < 1, the empirical quantile under Ft(·), t ∈ T , is then given by
qˆt,Nt(α) ≡ inf{y ∈ R++ : Fˆt,Nt(y) > α}. (18)
Under standard regularity conditions, the estimator in Equation (18) is consistent for
the true α-quantile under Ft(·), defined in Equation (3). Consistency of qˆt,Nt(α) can
be extended to cases where the sample (Xt,1, ..., Xt,Nt) is weakly dependent, provided
additional moment assumptions (Pollard, 1991; Portnoy, 1991; Koenker and Zhao, 1996;
Komunjer, 2005; Chernozhukov, 2005); for the sake of simplicity, we focus on the inde-
pendent case.
To alleviate the notation, we drop the reference to t when doing so introduces no
ambiguities. Hence we use the notation N , FˆN(·) and qˆN(α) to denote the size of the
sample (X1, ..., XN ), the corresponding empirical distribution function and the α-quantile
estimator in Equation (18).
As pointed out previously, the main object of interest are α-quantiles with probabil-
ities α close to unity. How close α is to 1 is determined by the sample size N ; hence we
the support of θ as T = t (i.e. Et) or the corresponding probabilities pt; this however is not our objective
here.
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let this probability be a function of the sample size, and we denote it by αN . Knowing
how α varies with N will then enable us to answer the question: for a given sample size
N how large α needs to be for the ordering in Theorem 2(ii) to hold.
5.2 Central Limit Theory for Intermediate Empirical Quantiles
We now derive the asymptotic distribution of qˆN(αN) in Equation (18) when limN→∞ αN =
1 and when (1−αN)N has a positive limit as N goes to infinity. In particular, we consider
the case where limN→∞(1 − αN)N = ∞. This last condition describes how fast α has
to go to unity relative to the sample size N ; knowing that N−1 = o(1− αN) we can use
an appropriate limit theory result to derive an asymptotic distribution of the α-quantile
estimator qˆN(αN) in Equation (18).
We shall need the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Consider a random sample (X1, ..., XN ) of size N from F (·) and let qˆN(αN)
be the corresponding empirical αN -quantile. If the distribution tail F¯ ∈ Γ with auxiliary
function a(·) and with density f(·) which is eventually non-increasing, then, provided
limN→∞ αN = 1 and limN→∞(1− αN)N = ∞ we have:
√
N(1− αN) qˆN(αN)− q(αN)
a(q(αN))
d→ N
and
qˆN(βN)− qˆN(αN)
a(q(αN))
p→ ln ρ
where N is a standard Gaussian random variable and βN is such that αN < βN < 1 and
(1− αN)/(1− βN) → ρ with ρ > 1.
Lemma 4 presents two limit results. The first was proved by Falk (1989). The second
is new.
The first result in the lemma shows the asymptotic behavior of intermediate empirical
quantiles when αN depends on the sample size N . It is an extension of the well-known re-
sult for central α-quantiles with α ∈ (0, 1) fixed (Mosteller, 1946; Smirnov, 1952; Siddiqui,
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1960; Bahadur, 1966; Bassett and Koenker, 1978; Powell, 1984, 1986), to the case where
α increases with the sample size N . Dekkers and de Haan (1989) and Chernozhukov
(2005) prove this extension under an additional assumption on the tail behavior of F (·).
While it is not new, we include a proof of the first result to make the paper self-contained,
and because it requires little beyond what we need to prove the second result.
The second limit result of Lemma 4 is important because it gives us a consistent
estimator of the variance of the empirical quantile. Recall that Theorem 2 says that
the conditional quantiles of X must be increasing in t. With consistent estimators of
quantiles in hand, a test seems easy to derive. The problem, though, is that we do not
know how the asymptotic variances of the quantile estimators change with t. Our second
result in Lemma 4 allows us to solve the problem.
The second limit result of Lemma 4 extends a result on the asymptotic distribution
of the quantile spacings derived by Dekkers and de Haan (1989) for the case ρ = 2 (see
also Chernozhukov (2005)). The result by Dekkers and de Haan (1989) requires that
dF¯−1(y)/dy is in R−1 at 0, an assumption that we need to avoid because it would imply
a restriction on the equilibrium-selection probabilities, pt(·). By focusing on consistency,
and not on the asymptotic distribution of quantile spacings, we obtain a result only
assuming that F¯ (·) in Γ and that f(·) if eventually non-increasing. Consistency, in turn,
is sufficient for our testing procedure.
We should note that the assumption that f(·) be eventually non-increasing imposes
no restriction on the equilibrium-selection probabilities pt(·), and follows from requiring
the density of Hθ,t(·) to be eventually non-increasing.
5.3 Estimates for Conditional Quantiles under ((Et, pt, (Hθ,t)θ∈Et) , t ∈ T )
We now assume a collection of random samples for different values of T . Concretely, con-
sider a statistical reduced-form model ((Et, pt, (Hθ,t)θ∈Et) , t ∈ T ), and assume we observe
realizations from k > 2 random samples (Xt1,1, ..., Xt1,Nt1 ) to (Xtk,1, ..., Xtk,Ntk ) of sizes
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Nt1 to Ntk , respectively. The samples are assumed independent and drawn from the k
distributions Ft1(·) to Ftk(·), respectively, with (t1, ..., tk) ∈ T k.
In order to use the results of Lemma 4 we need to impose the following assumption
on the tails of the distributions Hθ,t(·):
Assumption S4: Say that a statistical reduced-form model ((Et, pt, (Hθ,t)θ∈Et) , t ∈ T )
satisfies S4 if it satisfies S3 and, in addition, for every (t, θt) ∈ T × Et the densities
hθt,t(·) are eventually non-increasing.
The limit results of Lemma 4 then yield the following result:
Theorem 5. Assume ((Et, pt, (Hθ,t)θ∈Et) , t ∈ T ) satisfies S4, and let (Xtj ,1, ..., Xtj ,Ntj ),
1 6 j 6 k, be k independent random samples of size Ntj from Ftj(·) with tj ∈ T . If for
all j, 1 6 j 6 k, 0 < αNtj < βNtj < 1, limNj→∞ αNtj = 1, limNtj→∞
(
1− αNtj
)
Ntj = ∞
and limNtj→∞(1− αNtj )/(1− βNtj ) = ρtj with ρtj > 1, then
√
(1− αNtj )Ntj(ln ρtj)
[
qˆtj ,Ntj (αNtj )− qtj(αNtj )
qˆtj ,Ntj (αNtj )− qˆtj ,Ntj (βNtj )
]
d→ Nj,
where N1, ...,Nk are k independent standard normal random variables.
For any given k > 2, the results of Theorem 5 allow us to determine the asymptotic
behavior of estimates for conditional quantiles under Ft(·) . With conditional quantile
estimators in hand, we can then test the implications in Theorem 2.
For the purpose of testing, we make an assumption on the rate of growth of the
different samples. The assumption ensures that the (1−αNtj )Ntj grow at the same speed,
and that we consider the same αN -quantile, for all k samples. We can then formulate
our results in the standard asymptotic framework, i.e. as N → ∞. Concretely, assume
that the sample sizes (Nt1 , ..., Ntk) and the corresponding probabilities (αNt1 , ..., αNtk ) are
such that there exists αN , 0 < αN < 1, limN→∞(1−αN)N = ∞, and ctj , 1 ≤ j ≤ k, such
that
αNtj = αN and Ntj = ctjN, with ctj > 0 for every j, 1 6 j 6 k. (19)
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6 Testing
6.1 Test Hypotheses
From Theorem 2, the implication of our statistical reduced-form model ((Et, pt, (Hθ,t)θ∈Et) , t ∈ T )
is that t1 < ... < tk implies qt1(αN) < ... < qtk(αN) as αN → 1. Hence, we are inter-
ested in testing weather an increase in the exogenous variable results in an increase in
conditional quantiles of the endogenous variable. The opposite case of interest is the one
in which an increase in t produces no effect on the conditional quantiles of X, so that
t1 < ... < tk and qt1(αN) = ... = qtk(αN). Those two cases define our null and alternative
hypotheses.
More formally, for given values t1 < ... < tk we test the null hypothesis H0 : qt1(αN) =
... = qtk(αN), as αN → 1, against an ordered alternative H1 : qt1(αN) 6 ... 6 qtk(αN), as
αN → 1, with strict inequality for at least one value of j, 1 6 j 6 k.
Our test statistic is a function of estimates for conditional quantiles under Ft(·); from
Theorems 2 and 5 we know that the latter satisfy the following property:
Corollary 6. Assume ((Et, pt, (Hθ,t)θ∈Et) , t ∈ T ) satisfies S2 and S4. If for N ∈ N,
(Xtj ,1, ..., Xtj ,ctj N),1 6 j 6 k, are k independent random samples of size ctjN from
Ftj(·), tj ∈ T , then, as N →∞, t1 < ... < tk implies µt1 < ... < µtk , with
µtj ≡ qtj(αN),
qˆtj ,ctj N(αN)− µtj
σˆtj
d→ Nj, and σˆtj ≡
qˆtj ,ctj N(αN)− qˆtj ,ctj N(βN)
(ln ρ)
√
ctj(1− αN)N
,
provided 0 < αN < βN < 1, limN→∞αN = 1, limN→∞(1 − αN)N = ∞ and limN→∞(1 −
αN)/(1− βN) = ρ, with ρ > 1, and where N1, ...,Nk are k independent standard normal
random variables.
6.2 Exact test for Order Restrictions
Assume for the moment that all the distribution results from Corollary 6 are exact rather
than being asymptotic, i.e. assume that for some probability αN close to 1 and for large
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enough N , (qˆt1,ctj N(αN), ..., qˆtk,ctkN(αN)) is a sample from k independent and normally-
distributed random variables with means (µt1 , ..., µtk) and variances (σˆ
2
t1
, ..., σˆ2tk). Our
null and alternative hypotheses are then equivalent to H0 : µt1 = ... = µtk and H1 :
µt1 6 ... 6 µtk with at least one strict inequality. Note that having observed qˆtj ,Ntj (αN)
and qˆtj ,Ntj (βN), the variances σˆ
2
tj
, 1 6 j 6 k, are known. So the implications of our
reduced-form model in Section 2.3 can be restated in terms of the means
(
µt1 , ..., µtk
)
of
k independent Gaussian random variables with known variances.
A likelihood-ratio (LR) test of H0 against H1 is now available from the existing
literature (e.g. Bartholomew (1959a,b); Barlow, Bartholomew, Bremner, and Brunk
(1972) and Robertson and Wegman (1978)). We shall review Barholomew’s results, as
they are instrumental in the extension to the our case of asymptotic normality.
We introduce the following notation: qˆ ≡ (qˆt1,ct1N(αN), ..., qˆtk,ctkN(αN))′, µ ≡ (µt1 , ..., µtk)′
and Σˆ ≡ diag(σˆ2t1 , ..., σˆ2tk). Hence, for a given value of N , the k-vector qˆ is multivariate
normal with mean µ and diagonal covariance matrix Σˆ. Letting A be a (k−1)×k-matrix
A ≡


1 −1 (0)
. . . . . .
(0) 1 −1

 ,
we can write the null and the alternative hypotheses as
H0 : {Aµ = 0} against H1 : {Aµ 4 0 and Aµ 6= 0} , (20)
where the inequalities 4 and < are understood as component wise.
The likelihood-ratio test of the above hypothesis is based on the statistic
ξˆLR ≡ −2 ln
max
Aµ=0
L(qˆ|µ, Σˆ)
max
Aµ40
L(qˆ|µ, Σˆ) , (21)
where L(qˆ|µ, Σˆ) is the likelihood function
L(qˆ|µ, Σˆ) = 1
(2pi)k/2(det Σˆ)1/2
exp
[
−(qˆ − µ)′Σˆ−1(qˆ − µ)
]
. (22)
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Combining Equations (21) and (22) then yields
ξˆLR = min
Aµ=0
(qˆ − µ)′Σˆ−1(qˆ − µ)− min
Aµ40
(qˆ − µ)′Σˆ−1(qˆ − µ). (23)
Barlow, Bartholomew, Bremner, and Brunk (1972) show that the test statistic in
Equation (23)—similar to the χ2 statistic used to test for H0 against the most general
form of alternative H2 : µt1 6= ... 6= µtk—is a weighted average of χ2 distributions with d
degrees of freedom (χ2d) with 0 6 d 6 k − 1, and is denoted by χ¯2k. (χ20 denotes a point
mass at 0.)
The χ¯2k distribution of the likelihood-ratio test statistic ξˆLR depends on the number of
quantiles being compared k, as well as their variances σˆ2tj through the probability weights
attached to each distribution χ2d. For example, when k = 2 and 3, the distribution of ξˆLR
is given by
ξˆLR
d
=
1
2
χ2(0) +
1
2
χ2(1), for k = 2, (24)
ξˆLR
d
=
αˆ
2pi
χ2(0) +
1
2
χ2(1) +
[
1
2
− αˆ
2pi
]
χ2(2), for k = 3, (25)
where the constant αˆ, −pi < αˆ < pi, is defined as αˆ ≡ arccos
[
σˆ2t2/
√
(σˆ2t1 + σˆ
2
t2
)(σˆ2t2 + σˆ
2
t3
)
]
.
In the special case where the variances σˆ2tj are equal Bartholomew (1959b) computes
the χ¯2k critical values for a number of values for k (2 6 k 6 12). When the variances
are different, exact critical values for χ¯2k are hard to obtain if k > 5, though there is no
difficulty in obtaining their numerical values for any k (Barlow, Bartholomew, Bremner,
and Brunk, 1972). Stochastic upper and lower bounds for the distribution of ξˆLR have
been obtained by Robertson and Wright (1982) and Dardanoni and Forcina (1998).
6.3 Asymptotic test
We shall now derive a test for the case obtained in Section 5, where normality is only
asymptotic. Using the notation of Section 6.2, the k-vector Σˆ−1/2(qˆ−µ) is asymptotically
multivariate normal with mean vector 0k and identity covariance matrix Idk.
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Note that the standard way of dealing with asymptotically valid order restriction tests
(Gourieroux, Holly, and Monfort, 1982; Kodde and Palm, 1986) does not apply, as the
components of the scaling matrix Σˆ are not all proportional to N−1/2. In order to make
sure that Σˆ does not become ill-scaled as N gets large—that some of the variance terms
σˆtj become infinitely large compared to others—we assume the following:
Assumption S5: Say that a statistical reduced-form model ((Et, pt, (Hθ,t)θ∈Et) , t ∈ T )
satisfies S5 if it satisfies S4 and, in addition, Hθ,t(·) = H(·) for every (t, θ) ∈ T ×Θ.
In the error model (5), for example, the assumption S5 is satisfied if the error ε is
independent of the exogenous variable T and the equilibrium level θ. When the distribu-
tions Hθ,t(·) do not depend on t or θ, the same is true for the quantities involved in the
previous limit results. In particular, under S5 we have that aθ¯t,t ◦ H¯−1θ¯t,t(·) = a ◦ H¯−1(·)
for all (t, θt) ∈ T × Et; so using Lemma 3 (ii) gives us
σtj
σti
=
ati(qtj(αN))/
√
ctj(1− αN)N
ati(qti(αN))/
√
cti(1− αN)N
∼
√
cti
ctj
θ¯ti
θ¯tj
, as αN → 1. (26)
In other words, the scaling constants σtj that control how fast the empirical quantiles
qˆtj ,ctj N(αN) converge to the true quantiles qtj(αN), are all of the same size. In that case,
we have have the following result.
Theorem 7. Assume ((Et, pt, (Hθ,t)θ∈Et) , t ∈ T ) satisfies S5. If for N ∈ N, (Xtj ,1,
..., Xtj ,ctj N), 1 6 j 6 k, are k independent samples of ctjN independent draws from
Ftj(·), tj ∈ T , then as N → ∞, the likelihood-ratio statistic ξˆLR is asymptotically dis-
tributed as χ¯2k, with weights that are consistently estimated by weights obtained in the
exact Gaussian case.
For example, when k = 2 and 3, the asymptotic distribution of ξˆLR is that derived in
Equations (24)− (25).
The conclusion of Theorem 7 remains valid if, instead of being independent of θ and t,
the distributions Hθ,t(·) are such that for any (t, t′) ∈ T 2, the ratios hθ¯t,t(H¯−1θ¯t,t(y))/hθ¯t′ ,t′(H¯
−1
θ¯t′ ,t
′
(y))
have some finite and strictly positive limit as y goes to zero.
32
7 Conclusion
In this paper we design an econometric test for monotone comparative statics predic-
tions suited for testing models with multiple equilibria. Many economic models possess
multiple equilibria, which has traditionally posed a severe challenge for deriving testable
implications. Our approach may be characterized as nonparametric as we do not make
assumptions on the cardinality, location or probabilities over equilibria. In particular,
one can implement our methods without assuming an equilibrium-selection rule.
First, we show how monotone comparative statics predictions translate into observable
implications on the distribution of the endogenous variable. In particular, we show
that high enough conditional quantiles of the endogenous variable increase when the
exogenous variable increases. Even though the focus of this paper is on quantiles with
probabilities close to one, all of our results—when properly transposed—continue to hold
for probabilities close to zero.
Second, we construct a likelihood-ratio test for equality of high conditional quan-
tiles against an ordered alternative, as predicted by the monotone comparative statics
arguments. The test is any asymptotic extension of the “chi-bar” squared test.
Finally, we point out some extensions: our likelihood-ratio test can be accommodated
to test other hypotheses of interest, such as the unrestricted order among conditional
quantiles. Provided that quantile probabilities increase towards one at the same speed
as the sample size—which would satisfy the requirement of “large enough” quantile in
our paper—this would give rise to other limit distributions. It would be interesting to
compare our existing test with one based on such extreme conditional quantiles. In order
to carry out our likelihood-ratio test, we needed to eliminate the nuisance parameters—
quantile variances—by replacing them with their probability limits. An alternative ap-
proach is to use the asymptotic distribution results of the quantile spacings and derive a
better approximation to standardized quantiles in the small sample. Finally, a regression-
based approach—in which the conditional quantile is modeled as a function of the ex-
ogenous variable—would offer an interesting alternative way of testing the monotonicity
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prediction.
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Appendix A Preliminary Lemmas.
Lemmas 8, 9 and 10 are simple translations of results in de Haan (1970) to our problem.
Lemmas 11, and 12 present more substantial preliminary results we shall need in the
proof of Lemma 4.
In the sequel, H¯(·) is a distribution tail H¯ : R++ → (0, 1) and H¯−1(·) the correspond-
ing quantile function H¯−1 : (0, 1) → R++.
Lemma 8. If H¯ ∈ R−∞ at ∞, then H¯−1 ∈ R0 at 0.
Proof. Let U(x) ≡ H¯(x) for all x > 0; U(·) is non-increasing. If U(·) is −∞-varying at
∞, then by Corollary 1.2.1 (5) in de Haan (1970), the function x 7→ inf{y|U(y) 6 1/x} is
0-varying at ∞. It is easy to verify that this function is x 7→ H¯−1(1/x). Then for λ > 0,
limy↓0 H¯−1(λy)/H¯−1(y) = lims→∞ H¯−1(λ/s)/H¯−1(1/s) = 1 where s ≡ 1/y. Thus H¯−1(·)
is 0-varying at 0.
Lemma 9. If H¯−1 ∈ R0 at 0, then for all sequences {aN} and {a′N} of positive numbers
with limN→∞ aN = limN→∞ a′N = 0 and limN→∞ aN/a
′
N = c (0 < c < ∞), we have
lim
N→∞
H¯−1(aN)
H¯−1(a′N)
= 1.
Proof. Let U(x) ≡ H¯−1(1/x) for all x > 1 so U ∈ R0 at ∞. Let {αN} and {α′N} be
sequences of positive numbers with αN ≡ 1/aN and α′N ≡ 1/a′N so that limN→∞ αN =
limN→∞ α′N = ∞ and limN→∞ αN/α′N = 1/c (0 < 1/c < ∞). By applying Corollary 1.2.1
(2) in de Haan (1970) we then have limN→∞ H¯−1(aN)/H¯−1(a′N) = limN→∞ U(αN)/U(α
′
N) =
(1/c)0 = 1.
Lemma 10. Consider a distribution tail H¯ ∈ Γ with auxiliary function a(·). Let H(·)
be twice differentiable on R++ with a density h(·) that is eventually non-increasing. Let
W (x) ≡ H¯−1(exp(−x)), for x > 0. Then W (·) is twice continuously differentiable on
R++ with W
′(x) = a[H¯−1(exp(−x))], for x > 0, and for any real interval [a, b] we have:
(i) limx→∞ W ′(x + s)/W ′(x) = 1 , uniformly for s in [a, b];
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(ii) limx→∞ W ′′(x + s)/W ′(x) = 0 , uniformly for s in [a, b].
Proof. First we prove (i). Note that a (W (x)) = exp(−x)/h(W (x)) = W ′(x). From
Lemma 3 we know that a ◦ H¯−1 ∈ R0 at 0, so
lim
x→∞
W ′(x + s)
W ′(x)
= lim
x→∞
a(H¯−1(exp(−x− s)))
a(H¯−1(exp(−x))) = 1, for s > 0. (27)
By Corollary 1.2.1 in de Haan (1970), the convergence is uniform on intervals [a, b] with
a > 0. This implies that the convergence is uniform on arbitrary intervals [a, b] by the
change of variables y = x− |a| − η, for some η > 0 (and for x > |a|+ η) by the resulting
uniform convergence on [η, b + |a|+ η].
We now prove (ii). First note that a (W (x)) = W ′(x) implies that
W ′′(x + s)
W ′(x)
=
[
W ′(x + s)
W ′(x)
]
a′(W (x + s)). (28)
The bracketed term on the right-hand side of Equation (28) converges to 1 uniformly
on [a, b] by item (i) of the Lemma. We shall prove that a′(W (x + s)) → 0 as x → ∞
uniformly on [a, b]; combined, these two properties establish (ii).
Now a(x) = H¯(x)/h(x), so a′(x) = −1− H¯(x)h′(x)/[h(x)]2. Then, H¯ ∈ Γ implies, by
Theorem 2.7.4 in de Haan (1970) (or Proposition 1.18 in Resnick (1987)), that
lim
x→∞
H¯(x)h′(x)
[h(x)]2
= −1, i.e. lim
x→∞
a′(x) = 0. (29)
Fix x > 0 large enough so that x + a > 0. The range of a′(W (x + s)) when s ∈ [a, b]
is the same as the range of a′(y) when y ∈ [W (x + a),W (x + b)], as W (·) is monotone
increasing. Since a′(·) is continuous, we can let y(x) be such that
a′(y(x)) = sup
y∈[W (x+a),W (x+b)]
a′(y). (30)
Now, y(x) →∞ as x →∞ because W (·) is monotone increasing. Then the right-hand-
side of Equation (30) converges to 0 as x → ∞, because a′(·) converges to 0 (29). This
proves the needed uniform convergence of a′(W (x + s)) in Equation (28).
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Lemma 11. Let {cN} be a sequence of strictly positive real numbers such that limN→∞ cN =
∞, and consider f : R → R. Let {XN} and {YN} be two independent stochastic pro-
cesses. If
1. XN
d→ X, as N →∞, for some X with continuous distribution F (·),
2. YN
as→∞, as N →∞,
3. for each K > 0, limy→∞ f(x + y) = 1 uniformly in x ∈ [−K,K].
Then
cN
∫ XN/cN
0
f (x + YN) dx
d→ X, as N →∞.
Proof. Fix a realization {yN} of {YN} such that limN→∞ yN = ∞; the almost sure conver-
gence in item 2 ensures that {yN} with limN→∞ yN = ∞ have full measure. Let z ∈ R+
and denote by BN the event{
cN
∫ XN/cN
0
f (x + yN) dx ≤ z
}
.
Let ε > 0. We shall prove that there is a N ∗ such that N > N ∗ implies that |P (BN)− F (z)| <
ε; here P denotes the probability measure on the space on which {XN} is defined.
Fix δ > 0 such that F (z/(1− δ))− F (z/(1 + δ)) < ε/4. Let K ∈ R be large enough
that K > z/(1 − δ), F (−K) < ε/4 and 1 − F (K) < ε/4. Since XN d→ X, there is N1
such that n ≥ N1 implies
P{|XN | > K} < ε/2 (31)
F (z/(1 + δ))− ε/4 < P{XN 6 z/(1 + δ)} (32)
P{XN 6 z/(1− δ)} < F (z/(1− δ)) + ε/4 (33)
Let BKN = BN ∩ {|XN | 6 K}. Then, by Statement (31), N > N1 implies that P (BN)−
P (BKN ) 6 P{|XN | > K} < ε/2.
The convergence in item 3 is uniform on [−K,K], so there is N ∗ such that N ∗ > N1
and such that N > N ∗ implies that, for all x˜ ∈ [−K,K], (1− δ) < f(x˜ + yN) < (1 + δ).
42
Then, N > N ∗ implies
x˜(1− δ) < cN
∫ x˜/cN
0
f (x + yN) dx < x˜(1 + δ),
if x˜ ≥ 0, and
x˜(1 + δ) < cN
∫ x˜/cN
0
f (x + yN) dx < x˜(1− δ),
if x˜ < 0.
Then P {XN(1 + δ) ≤ z,XN ≥ 0} ≤ P (BKN )∩{XN ≥ 0} ≤ P {XN(1− δ) ≤ z,XN ≥ 0}.
And since z ≥ 0, P {XN(1− δ) ≤ z,XN < 0} = P (BKN )∩{XN < 0} = P {XN(1 + δ) ≤ z,XN < 0}.
Hence, P {XN(1 + δ) ≤ z} ≤ P (BKN ) ≤ P {XN(1− δ) ≤ z}.
Now,
|F (z)− P {XN(1 + δ) ≤ z}| ≤ |F (z)− F (z/(1 + δ))|
+ |F (z/(1 + δ))− P {XN(1 + δ) ≤ z}|
≤ ε/4 + ε/4,
by the definition of δ and Statement (32). And similarly for P {XN(1− δ) ≤ z}. So
∣∣F (z)− P (BKN )∣∣ < ε/2.
Finally, then, N ≥ N ∗ implies that
|F (x)− P (BN)| 6
∣∣F (z)− P (BKN )∣∣ + ∣∣P (BN)− P (BKN )∣∣
< ε/2 + ε/2.
The argument for z < 0 is analogous. The proof follows because {XN} and {YN} are
independent.
Lemma 12. Let {cN} be a sequence of strictly positive real numbers such that limN→∞ cN =
∞, and consider f : R → R. Let {XN} be a stochastic process and {yN} a sequence of
strictly positive real numbers. If
1. XN
d→ X, as N →∞, for some X with continuous distribution F (·),
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2. limN→∞ yN = ∞,
3. for each K > 0, limy→∞ f(x + y) = 0 uniformly in x ∈ [−K,K].
Then
cN
∫ XN/cN
0
f (x + yN) dx
p→ 0, as N →∞.
Proof. Let η > 0 and denote by BN the event{∣∣∣∣∣cN
∫ XN/cN
0
f (x + yN) dx
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ η
}
.
We shall prove that P (BN) → 1.
Let ε > 0. Let K > 0 be large enough that F (−K) < ε/2 and 1− F (K) < ε/2. By
the uniform convergence of f(·) on [−K,K], there is N ∗ such that N ≥ N ∗ implies that,
for all x˜ ∈ [−K,K], |f(x˜ + yN)| < η/K. Then, for all N ≥ N ∗ and x˜ ∈ [−K,K],∣∣∣∣∣cN
∫ x˜/cN
0
f (x + yN) dx
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ |x˜| η/K ≤ η,
as |x˜| ≤ K. So N ≥ N ∗ implies that P (BN) ≥ P {XN ≤ K} > 1 − ε, by the definition
of K.
Lemma 13. Let A1, ..., AN be a random sample from FA(x) = 1− exp(−x) with x > 0,
and let A
(N)
(1) 6 ... 6 A
(N)
(N) be the ascending order statistics of (A1, ..., AN ). Consider
orders (m, k) ∈ N2 such that m < k ≤ N . If m →∞, k →∞ and N →∞ in a way that
(N−m) →∞, (N−m)/N → 0, (N−k) →∞, (N−k)/N → 0 and (N−m)/(N−k) → ρ
where ρ > 1, then
√
N −m + 1
[
A
(N)
(m) − ln
N
N −m
]
d→ N1 and
√
N −m
[
A
(N)
(k) − A(N)(m) − ln ρ√
ρ− 1
]
d→ N2
where N1 and N2 are two independent standard normal random variables.
Proof. Using Renyi (1953) representation, we know that {A(N)(N−k+1) − A(N)(N−k)}Nk=1
d
=
{Zk/k}Nk=1 where A(N)(0) ≡ 0 and where Z1, ..., ZN are independent and identically dis-
tributed standard exponential random variables. Then for any m, 1 6 m 6 N , and any
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k, m < k 6 N , we have
A
(N)
(m)
d
=
∑N
j=N−m+1
Zj
j
and A
(N)
(k) − A(N)(m)
d
=
∑N−m
l=N−k+1
Zl
l
, (34)
which are independent. When m →∞, k →∞ and N →∞ in a manner that (N−m) →
∞, (N −m)/N → 0, (N − k) → ∞, (N − k)/N → 0 and (N −m)/(N − k) → ρ with
ρ > 1, we can apply the central limit theorem in Liapunov’s form to the sums of random
variables in Equation (34) (see Theorem 4 in Renyi (1953), for example) to get
A
(N)
(m) −M1
S1
d→ N1 and
A
(N)
(k) − A(N)(m) −M2
S2
d→ N2, (35)
with N1 and N2 two independent standard normal random variables where
M1 ≡
N∑
j=N−m+1
1
j
=
N∑
l=1
1
l
−
N−m∑
n=1
1
n
= ln N + γ + O(N−1)− ln(N −m)− γ + O((N −m)−1)
= ln
N
N −m + O((N −m)
−1), (36)
S21 ≡
N∑
j=N−m+1
1
j2
=
1
N −m + 1 −
1
N
+
θ
(N −m)(N −m + 1)
=
1
N −m + 1 + o((N −m)
−1), (37)
where γ is the Euler-Mascheroni constant and 0 < θ < 1; similarly
M2 ≡
N−m∑
j=N−k+1
1
j
=
N−m∑
l=1
1
l
−
N−k∑
n=1
1
n
= ln
N −m
N − k + O((N −m)
−1)
= ln ρ + O((N −m)−1), (38)
S22 ≡
N−m∑
j=N−k+1
1
j2
=
1
N − k + 1 −
1
N −m +
φ
(N − k)(N − k + 1)
=
ρ− 1
N −m + o((N −m)
−1), (39)
where 0 < φ < 1 and ρ > 1. Combining Equations (35)− (39) then yields the result.
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Appendix B Proofs of results stated in the text.
Proof of Lemma 1. Fix t ∈ T and assume H¯θ¯t,t ∈ R−∞ at ∞. Let Ut : R++ → R++ be
given by
Ut(x) ≡ pt(θ¯t)
H¯θ¯t,t(x/θ¯t)
F¯t(x)
. (40)
Note that Ut(·) is well defined, as for any θt ∈ Et we have H¯θt,t(x) > 0 and therefore
F¯t(x) > 0, for all x > 0. The definition of Ft(·) in Equation (2) implies that
Ut(x) =
pt(θ¯t)H¯θ¯t,t(x/θ¯t)
pt(θ¯t)H¯θ¯t,t(x/θ¯t)
[
1 +
∑
θ∈Et\{θ¯t}
pt(θ)H¯θ,t(x/θ)
pt(θ¯t)H¯θ¯t,t(x/θ¯t)
] . (41)
Now note that
pt(θ)H¯θ,t(x/θ)
pt(θ¯t)H¯θ¯t,t(x/θ¯t)
=
pt(θ)
pt(θ¯t)
H¯θ,t(x/θ)
H¯θ¯t,t(x/θ)
H¯θ¯t,t(x/θ)
H¯θ¯t,t(x/θ¯t)
, (42)
and that for any θ ∈ Et\{θ¯t}, θ < θ¯t. Given that H¯θ¯t,t(·) is (−∞)-varying at ∞, we have
lim
x→∞
H¯θ¯t,t(x/θ)
H¯θ¯t,t(x/θ¯t)
= lim
s→∞
H¯θ¯t,t(sθ¯t/θ)
H¯θ¯t,t(s)
= 0, (43)
(with s = x/θ¯t), so the last term on the right hand side of Equation (42) goes to 0 as x
gets large. Property (16) implies that the middle term H¯θ,t(x/θ)/H¯θ¯t,t(x/θ) is bounded.
So
lim
x→∞
Ut(x) = 1, (44)
and
F¯t(x) ∼ pt(θ¯t)H¯θ¯t,t(x/θ¯t), as x →∞. (45)
From Equation (45)
lim
x→∞
F¯t(λx)
F¯t(x)
= lim
x→∞
H¯θ¯t,t(λx/θ¯t)
H¯θ¯t,t(x/θ¯t)
= lim
s→∞
H¯θ¯t,t(λs)
H¯θ¯t,t(s)
,
so F¯t ∈ R−∞ at ∞, which together with Equation (45) shows that item (i) holds.
We shall now prove item (ii). Using Lemma 8, H¯−1
θ¯t,t
(·) is 0-varying at 0: for λ > 0,
lim
y↓0
H¯−1
θ¯t,t
(λy)
H¯−1
θ¯t,t
(y)
= 1. (46)
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On the other hand, limx→∞ F¯t(x) = 0 and Equation (44) imply that limx→∞ F¯t(x)Ut(x)/pt(θ¯t) =
0, and
lim
x→∞
F¯t(x)Ut(x)/pt(θ¯t)
F¯t(x)
=
1
pt(θ¯t)
.
That H¯−1
θ¯t,t
(·) is 0-varying at 0 then implies, by Lemma 9,
lim
x→∞
H¯−1
θ¯t,t
(F¯t(x)Ut(x)/pt(θ¯t))
H¯−1
θ¯t,t
(F¯t(x))
=
[
pt(θ¯t)
]0
= 1. (47)
Now, using Equation (40)
H¯−1
θ¯t,t
(F¯t(x)Ut(x)/pt(θ¯t))
H¯−1
θ¯t,t
(F¯t(x))
=
x/θ¯t
H¯−1
θ¯t,t
(F¯t(x))
, (48)
so Equation (47) implies that x/θ¯t ∼ H¯−1θ¯t,t(F¯t(x)) as x goes to ∞. Letting y = F¯t(x) we
then have
F¯−1t (y) ∼ θ¯tH¯−1θ¯t,t(y) as y ↓ 0. (49)
Equations (46) and (49) give
lim
y↓0
F¯−1t (λy)
F¯−1t (y)
= 1 for λ > 0,
so F¯−1t (·) is 0-varying at 0 which together with Equations (46) and (49) shows (ii).
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof of Theorem 2 follows from Lemma 1 easily by the argu-
ment used in Section 3. We include it here for completeness. (i) Consider (t1, t2) ∈ T 2
such that t1 < t2. From Lemma 1(i),
F¯t1(x)
F¯t2(x)
∼ pt1(θ¯t1)H¯θ¯t1 ,t1(x/θ¯t1)
pt2(θ¯t2)H¯θ¯t2 ,t2(x/θ¯t2)
, as x →∞.
Now note that
pt1(θ¯t1)H¯θ¯t1 ,t1(x/θ¯t1)
pt2(θ¯t2)H¯θ¯t2 ,t2(x/θ¯t2)
=
pt1(θ¯t1)
pt2(θ¯t2)
H¯θ¯t1 ,t1(x/θ¯t1)
H¯θ¯t1 ,t1(x/θ¯t2)
H¯θ¯t1 ,t1(x/θ¯t2)
H¯θ¯t1 ,t2(x/θ¯t2)
H¯θ¯t1 ,t2(x/θ¯t2)
H¯θ¯t2 ,t2(x/θ¯t2)
. (50)
Since θ¯t2 > θ¯t1 and H¯θ¯t1 ,t1 ∈ R−∞ at ∞, we have limx→∞ H¯θ¯t1 ,t1(x/θ¯t1)/H¯θ¯t1 ,t1(x/θ¯t2) =
limy→∞ H¯θ¯t1 ,t1((θ¯t2/θ¯t1)y)/H¯θ¯t1 ,t1(y) = 0 where y ≡ x/θ¯t2 . So the second term on the
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right-hand side of Equation (50) goes to 0 as x gets large. From assumption (16), θ < θ¯t2
implies that
H¯θ,t2(x/θ¯t2)
H¯θ¯t2 ,t2(x/θ¯t2)
is bounded. So the fourth term of the right-hand side of Equation (50) is bounded as x
goes to ∞. From Property (17), and given t1 < t2, we know that
H¯θ¯t1 ,t1(x/θ¯t2)
H¯θ¯t1 ,t2(x/θ¯t2)
is bounded as x → ∞. Hence the third term of the right-hand side of Equation (50) is
bounded as x increases. Finally, we know that pt1(θ¯t1)/pt2(θ¯t2) < ∞ since pt2(θ¯t2) > 0,
so the first term of the right-hand side of Equation (50) is finite.
Combining the facts above,
lim
x→∞
F¯t1(x)
F¯t2(x)
= 0,
so there is x¯1 > 0 such that, if x > x¯1 then F¯t1(x) < F¯t2(x). Since T is finite, there is x¯
such that if x > x¯ then F¯t(x) < F¯t′(x) for all (t, t
′) ∈ T 2 with t < t′. (ii) Note that for
any t ∈ T and y ∈ (0, 1), F¯−1t (y) = qt(1 − y). From (i), for any (t1, t2) ∈ T 2 such that
t1 < t2, there is y1 ∈ (0, 1) such that if y 6 y1 then qt1(1− y) < qt2(1− y). Equivalently,
letting α¯1 ≡ 1 − y1, for α ∈ [α¯1, 1) we have qt1(α) < qt2(α). T being finite guarantees
that (ii) holds by the same reasoning as in (i).
Proof of Lemma 3. Assume H¯θ¯t,t(·) is in Γ with auxiliary function aθ¯t,t(·); for Ut(·) defined
in Equation (40) we have
Ut(θ¯tx + θ¯tλaθ¯t,t(x))
Ut(θ¯tx)
=
[
pt(θ¯t)H¯θ¯t,t(x + λaθ¯t,t(x))
F¯t(θ¯tx + θ¯tλaθ¯t,t(x)))
] [
F¯t(θ¯tx)
pt(θ¯t)H¯θ¯t,t(x)
]
(51)
From Equation (44), the left-hand side in Equation (51) converges to 1 as x → ∞.
On the other hand,
lim
x→∞
pt(θ¯t)H¯θ¯t,t(x + λaθ¯t,t(x))
pt(θ¯t)H¯θ¯t,t(x)
= exp(−λ),
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as aθ¯t,t(·) is the auxiliary function of H¯θ¯t,t(·). Then we have
exp(λ) = lim
x→∞
F¯t(θ¯tx)
F¯t(θ¯tx + θ¯tλaθ¯t,t(x))
= lim
s→∞
F¯t(s)
F¯t(s + θ¯tλaθ¯t,t(s/θ¯t))
,
using s = θ¯tx. Hence F¯t ∈ Γ:
lim
s→∞
F¯t(s + λat(s))
F¯t(s)
= exp(−λ), (52)
with auxiliary function at(·) defined as at(x) ≡ θ¯taθ¯t,t(x/θ¯t) for all x > 0, which shows
item (i).
In order to show item (ii) we exploit the fact that for any sequence {ϕs}s>0 of mono-
tone increasing functions ϕs : R
+ → (0, 1), lims→∞ ϕs(x) = ϕ(x) for all continuity points
x > 0 of ϕ(·), implies lims→∞ ϕ−1s (z) = ϕ−1(z) for all continuity points z ∈ (0, 1) of
ϕ−1(·) (see, e.g., Lemma 1.9 in de Haan, 1974). Let then
ϕs(x) ≡ 1−
H¯θ¯t,t(s + xaθ¯t,t(s))
H¯θ¯t,t(s)
for all x > 0.
That H¯θ¯t,t ∈ Γ implies lims→∞ ϕs(x) = 1 − exp(−x) for all x > 0. Letting ϕ(x) ≡
1− exp(−x), we then have for z ∈ (0, 1)
lim
s→∞
H¯−1
θ¯t,t
(H¯θ¯t,t(s)(1− z))− s
aθ¯t,t(s)
= lim
s→∞
ϕ−1s (z) = ϕ
−1(z) = − ln(1− z).
Letting y ≡ H¯θ¯t,t(s) and µ ≡ 1− z gives
lim
y↓0
H¯−1
θ¯t,t
(yµ)− H¯−1
θ¯t,t
(y)
aθ¯t,t(H¯
−1
θ¯t,t
(y))
= − ln µ for µ ∈ (0, 1). (53)
Thus H¯−1
θ¯t,t
∈ Π as in Definition 3 with auxiliary function aθ¯t,t ◦ H¯−1θ¯t,t(·).
Moreover, for any λ > 0, letting µ ≡ λ and ν ≡ λ−1 we have
aθ¯t,t(H¯
−1
θ¯t,t
(λy))
aθ¯t,t(H¯
−1
θ¯t,t
(y))
= −
[
H¯−1
θ¯t,t
(µy)− H¯−1
θ¯t,t
(y)
aθ¯t,t(H¯
−1
θ¯t,t
(y))
][
aθ¯t,t(H¯
−1
θ¯t,t
(λy))
H¯−1
θ¯t,t
(λνy)− H¯−1
θ¯t,t
(λy)
]
. (54)
Equations (53) and (54) together imply
lim
y↓0
aθ¯t,t ◦ H¯−1θ¯t,t(λy)
aθ¯t,t ◦ H¯−1θ¯t,t(y)
=
ln µ
− ln ν = 1, (55)
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so aθ¯t,t ◦ H¯−1θ¯t,t ∈ R0 at 0.
We now study F¯t(·): if for any t ∈ T , we let ϕt,s(x) ≡ 1− F¯t(s + xat(s))/F¯t(s) for all
x > 0, we have limx→∞ ϕt,s(x) = ϕ(x). Same reasoning as previously then implies
lim
y↓0
F¯−1t (yµ)− F¯−1t (y)
at(F¯
−1
t (y))
= − ln µ for µ ∈ (0, 1). (56)
So F¯−1t ∈ Π as in Definition 3 with auxiliary function at ◦ F¯−1t (·). Equation (56) and the
equality
at(F¯
−1
t (λy))
at(F¯
−1
t (y))
= −
[
F¯−1t (µy)− F¯−1t (y)
at(F¯
−1
t (y))
] [
at(F¯
−1
t (λy))
F¯−1t (λνy)− F¯−1t (λy)
]
,
with λ > 0, µ ≡ λ and ν ≡ λ−1, then imply that at ◦ F¯−1t ∈ R0 at 0.
Given Equation (49) and the definition of at(·), it is not surprising to see that
at(F¯
−1
t (y)) ∼ θ¯taθ¯t,t(H¯−1θ¯t,t(y)) as y ↓ 0; however we need a formal proof of that state-
ment.
We start by showing that
lim
x→∞
F xt (axλ + bx) = exp[− exp(−λ)], (57)
with ax ≡ at(bx) and bx ≡ F¯−1t (1/x). In Equation (52), let x ≡ 1/F¯t(s) (or s = F¯−1t (1/x))
so x →∞ as s →∞; then
lim
x→∞
F¯t(F¯
−1
t (1/x) + λat(F¯
−1
t (1/x)))
F¯t(F¯
−1
t (1/x))
= lim
x→∞
x · F¯t[at(F¯−1t (1/x))λ + F¯−1t (1/x)]
= exp(−λ). (58)
Let bx ≡ F¯−1t (1/x) and ax ≡ at(bx); the last equality in Equation(58) together with
Lemma 2.2.2 in de Haan (1970) then imply Equation (57).
We now derive a similar equality involving H(·): the last equality in Equation (58)
and the tail equivalence property in Equation (45) implyF¯t(x) ∼ pt(θ¯t)H¯θ¯t,t(x/θ¯t), as
x →∞
lim
x→∞
x · H¯θ¯t,t[(ax/θ¯t)λ + (bx/θ¯t)] = exp(−λ− ln pt(θ¯t)).
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Using again Lemma 2.2.2 in de Haan (1970) then gives
lim
x→∞
Hxθ¯t,t((ax/θ¯t)λ + (bx/θ¯t)) = exp[− exp(−λ− ln pt(θ¯t))], (59)
with ax = at(bx) and bx = F¯
−1
t (1/x) as previously. On the other hand, H¯θ¯t,t ∈ Γ as in
Definition 2 with auxiliary function aθ¯t,t(·), together with Lemma 2.2.2 in de Haan (1970)
imply
lim
x→∞
Hxθ¯t,t(a˜xλ + b˜x) = exp[− exp(−λ)], (60)
with a˜x = aθ¯t,t(b˜x) and b˜x = H¯
−1
θ¯t,t
(1/x). Combining Equations (59) and (59) and applying
the results of Lemma 2.4.1 in de Haan (1970) on the change of norming constants (with
A = 1 and B = ln pt(θ¯t)), then gives
(ax/θ¯t)
a˜x
→ 1 and (bx/θ¯t)− b˜x
a˜x
→ ln pt(θ¯t) as x →∞.
So
at(F¯
−1
t (y)) ∼ θ¯taθ¯t,t(H¯−1θ¯t,t(y)) as y ↓ 0,
which completes the proof of item (ii).
Proof of Lemma 4. Given a random sample (X1, ..., XN ) let {X(N)(k) }Nk=1 be the ascending
order statistics: X
(N)
(1) 6 ... 6 X
(N)
(N) . Then for any αN , 0 < αN < 1, we have
qˆN(αN) = X
(N)
(m) with m ≡ bαNNc+ 1, (61)
where b·c denotes the greatest integer function, bxc ≡ max{n ∈ N : n 6 x} for x > 0.
Note that m depends on N . Similarly, for βN : qˆN(βN) = X
(N)
(k) where k ≡ bβNNc+ 1.
First we record the following facts, which follow trivially from the definition of m and
the hypotheses on αN in the theorem:
lim
N→∞
N −m = ∞, (62)
lim
N→∞
N −m
N
= 0, (63)
lim
N→∞
N −m
(1− αN)N = limN→∞
N −m + 1
(1− αN)N = 1. (64)
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The hypotheses on βN imply properties (62), (63), and (64) for k, and, in addition, that
lim
N→∞
N −m
N − k = ρ. (65)
Second, we have
√
N(1− αN)
[
qˆN(αN)− q(αN)
a(q(αN))
]
=
√
N(1− αN)
[
X
(N)
(bαNNc+1) − F¯−1(1− αN)
a(F¯−1(1− αN))
]
=
√
N −m + 1
[
X
(N)
(m) − F¯−1((N −m)/N)
a(F¯−1((N −m)/N)) +
F¯−1((N −m)/N)− F¯−1(1− αN)
a(F¯−1((N −m)/N))
]
×
(66)
a(F¯−1((N −m)/N))
a(F¯−1(1− αN))
√
N(1− αN)
N −m + 1 ,
and
qˆN(βN)− qˆN(αN)
a(q(αN))
− ln ρ
=
{[
X
(N)
(k) −X(N)(m)
a(X
(N)
(m) )
− ln ρ
]
a(X
(N)
(m) )
a(F¯−1((N −m)/N))+ (67)
ln ρ
[
a(X
(N)
(m) )
a(F¯−1((N −m)/N)) − 1
]}
a(F¯−1((N −m)/N))
a(F¯−1(1− αN)) .
The proof of the theorem is done in three steps. We first show (STEP 1) that
√
N −m + 1
[
X
(N)
(m) − F¯−1((N −m)/N)
a(F¯−1((N −m)/N))
]
d→ N , (68)
X
(N)
(k) −X(N)(m)
a(X
(N)
(m) )
P→ ln ρ, (69)
where N is a standard Gaussian random variable.
We then show (STEP 2)
lim
N→∞
√
N −m + 1
[
F¯−1((N −m)/N)− F¯−1(1− αN)
a(F¯−1((N −m)/N))
]
= 0 (70)
lim
N→∞
a(F¯−1((N −m)/N))
a(F¯−1(1− αN)) = 1. (71)
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Finally, we show (STEP 3)
a(X
(N)
(m) )
a(F¯−1((N −m)/N))
p→ 1. (72)
The first limit result of Lemma 4 then follows from (66) by (68), (70) and (71) using
(64) and Lemma 2.4.1 in de Haan (1970).
The second limit result in Lemma 4 follows from (67) by (69) and (72) using (71),
(64), and Slutsky’s Theorem.
STEP 1: This step takes a key idea from the proof of Theorem 3.1 in Dekkers and
de Haan (1989). Let A1, ..., AN be independent and identically distributed standard
exponential random variables. Let A
(N)
(1) 6 ... 6 A
(N)
(N) be the ascending order statis-
tics of (A1, ..., AN ). Then, by using the probability integral transform
{
X
(N)
(m)
}N
m=1
d
={
F¯−1(exp(−A(N)(m)))
}N
m=1
.
Now, let W (x) ≡ F¯−1(exp(−x)) for x > 0; we have X (N)(m)
d
= W (A
(N)
(m)) and W (ln(N/(N−
m))) = F¯−1((N −m)/N). Moreover,
a (W (x)) =
exp(−x)
f(W (x))
= W ′(x).
Let ηN ≡ ln(N/(N −m)); then, a
(
F¯−1 ((N −m) /N)) = W ′(ηN). So the expression in
Statement (68) can be written as
√
N −m + 1
[
X
(N)
(m) − F¯−1((N −m)/N)
a(F¯−1((N −m)/N))
]
d
=
√
N −m + 1
[
W (A
(N)
(m))−W (ηN)
W ′(ηN)
]
d
=
√
N −m + 1
∫ ZN/√N−m+1
0
W ′(ηN + s)
W ′(ηN)
ds, (73)
where ZN ≡
√
N −m + 1[A(N)(m) − ln(N/(N −m))].
Then, by Lemma 13, ZN
d→ N1 as N → ∞. But Lemma 10 (i) and Statement
(59) imply that the integrand on the right-hand side of (73) converges uniformly to 1 on
compact intervals, as N →∞. So Lemma 11 implies Statement (68).
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The proof of Statement (69) is similar. We have
X
(N)
(k) −X(N)(m)
a(X
(N)
(m) )
− ln ρ
d
=
W (A
(N)
(k) )−W (A(N)(m))
W ′(A(N)(m))
− ln ρ
d
=
[√
N −m
ρ− 1
∫ YN/q N−mρ−1
0
W ′(A(N)(m) + ln ρ + s)
W ′(A(N)(m))
ds
] √
ρ− 1
N −m
+
∫ ln ρ
0
[
W ′(A(N)(m) + s)
W ′(A(N)(m))
− 1
]
ds, (74)
where YN ≡
√
N−m
ρ−1 [A
(N)
(k) − A(N)(m) − ln ρ]. Note that {YN} and
{
A
(N)
(m)
}
are independent
(Renyi, 1953) and that A
(N)
(m)
as→∞ (see, e.g. Theorem 4 in Watts (1980)). By Lemma 13,
YN
d→ N2 as N → ∞, and the integrand in the first term of Equation (74) converges
uniformly to 1 on compact intervals. Hence, using Lemma 11 and Statement (57) the first
term in brackets in Equation (74) converges in distribution. It is multiplied by
(
ρ−1
N−m
)−1/2
,
which goes to zero. So the first summand of expression (74) converges in probability to
0 (it converges in distribution to the constant 0, so it converges in probability). On
the other hand, the second summand in expression (74) converges to 0 a.s.: Note that
A
(N)
(m)
as→ ∞ a.s. (by, e.g. Theorem 4 in Watts (1980)) and the integrand converges to 0
uniformly on compact intervals (Lemma 10 (i)), so the integral converges to 0 for a full
measure of realizations of
{
A
(N)
(m)
}
. This establishes Statement (69).
STEP 2: We now prove (70) and (71). Using the notation in Step 1:
√
N −m + 1
[
F¯−1((N −m)/N)− F¯−1(1− αN)
a(F¯−1((N −m)/N))
]
=
√
N −m + 1
[
W (ηN)−W (ln(1/(1− αN)))
W ′(ηN)
]
=
√
N −m + 1
∫ 0
− ln(1−αN )−ηN
W ′(ηN + s)
W ′(ηN)
ds
∼ √N −m + 1
[
0− ln N −m
(1− αN)N
]
as N →∞. (75)
The equivalence in Statement (75) follows by exchanging the limit and the integral, using
the uniform convergence established in Lemma 10 (i), and the fact that Statement (64)
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implies
lim
N→∞
[− ln(1− αN)− ηN ] = lim
N→∞
ln
N −m
(1− αN)N = 0.
The ln(·) function is concave, so |ln {(N −m)/[(1− αN)N ]}| 6 |(N −m)/[(1− αN)N ]− 1|.
Hence,
√
N −m + 1
∣∣∣∣ln N −m(1− αN)N
∣∣∣∣ 6 √N −m + 1
∣∣∣∣ N −m(1− αN)N − 1
∣∣∣∣
=
√
N −m + 1
∣∣∣∣αNN − bαNNc − 1(1− αN)N
∣∣∣∣
6 2
√
N −m + 1
(1− αN)N → 0, as N →∞,
where the convergence to 0 follows from Statement (64). By Statement (75), then, this
proves (70).
To prove (71), note that Lemma 3 (ii) implies that a ◦ F¯−1 ∈ R0 at 0. So State-
ments (63) and (64), and Lemma 9, give (71).
STEP 3: The proof of (72), in turn is similar to that of (68) in Step 1. We have
a(X
(N)
(m) )
a(F¯−1((N −m)/N)) − 1
d
=
W ′(A(N)(m))−W ′(ηN)
W ′(ηN)
d
=
[√
N −m
∫ ZN/√N−m+1
0
W ′′(ηN + s)
W ′(ηN)
ds
]
1√
N −m, (76)
where, ZN =
√
N −m + 1[A(N)(m) − ln(N/(N − m))]. Then, by Lemma 13, ZN
d→ N1 as
N → ∞. But Lemma 10 (ii) implies that the integrand on the right-hand side of (76)
converges uniformly to 0 on compact intervals. So Lemma 12 and Statement (57) imply
Statement (72).
Proof of Theorem 5. If ((Et, pt, (Hθ,t)θ∈Et) , t ∈ T ) satisfies S4 then it satisfies S3 ; hence
we can use Lemma 3(i) to show that for any tj ∈ T , 1 6 j 6 k, the conditional
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distribution tails F¯tj(·) ∈ Γ. Moreover, from Equation (2) we know that for any j,
1 6 j 6 k,
ftj(x) =
∑
θ∈Etj
ptj(θ)
θ
hθ,tj(x/θ) for any x > 0.
Under S4 the densities hθtj ,tj(·) are all eventually non-decreasing; hence the same holds
for ftj(·). If for each j, 1 6 j 6 k, we have 0 < αNtj < βNtj < 1, limNtj→∞ αNtj = 1,
limNtj→∞
(
1− αNtj
)
Ntj = ∞ and limNtj→∞(1 − αNtj )/(1 − βNtj ) = ρtj with ρtj > 1,
then the results of Lemma 4 apply for all j, 1 6 j 6 k, i.e.
√
Ntj(1− αNtj )
[
a(qtj(αNtj ))
]−1 [
qˆtj ,Ntj (αNtj )− qtj(αNtj )
]
d→ Nj,
and
qˆtj ,Ntj (βNtj )− qˆtj ,Ntj (αNtj )
a(qtj(αNtj ))
p→ ln ρtj ,
where Nj, 1 6 j 6 k, are k independent standard normal random variables. The con-
clusion Theorem 5 follows by using Slutsky’s Theorem and the independence of different
samples (Xtj ,1, ..., Xtj ,Ntj ).
Proof of Theorem 7. The proof is done in five steps:
STEP1: we work with the first minimization problem in Equation (23)
min
µ
(µ− qˆ)′Σˆ−1(µ− qˆ), (77)
subject to Aµ = 0.
Let L : R2k−1 → R be the corresponding Lagrangian
L(µ, λ) = (µ− qˆ)′Σˆ−1(µ− qˆ) + λ′Aµ,
where λ denotes the (k − 1)-vector of Lagrange multipliers (dual variables) associated
with the constraint Aµ = 0. A is full rank and the (Lagrange) dual function g : Rk−1 →
R ∪ {−∞} is
g(λ) = inf
µ
L(µ, λ)
= −1
4
λ′AΣˆA′λ + λ′Aqˆ.
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The dual problem is then
max
λ
−1
4
λ′AΣˆA′λ + λ′Aqˆ, (78)
with λ unconstrained. The solutions to the dual and primal problems (78) and (77) are
λ0 = 2(AΣˆA
′)−1Aqˆ, (79)
µ0 = qˆ −
1
2
ΣˆA′λ0
= qˆ − ΣˆA′(AΣˆA′)−1Aqˆ, (80)
and we have
(µ0 − qˆ)′Σˆ−1(µ0 − qˆ) = qˆ′A′(AΣˆA′)−1Aqˆ
= −1
4
λ′0AΣˆA
′λ0 + λ
′
0Aqˆ. (81)
Similarly, we consider the dual of the second minimization problem in (23)
min
µ
(µ− qˆ)′Σˆ−1(µ− qˆ), (82)
subject to Aµ 4 0.
The dual is
max
λ
−1
4
λ′AΣˆA′λ + λ′Aqˆ, (83)
subject to λ < 0.
Letting λ1 and µ1 denote the solutions to the dual and primal problems (83) and (82)
we again have
(µ1 − qˆ)′Σˆ−1(µ1 − qˆ) = −
1
4
λ′1AΣˆA
′λ1 + λ
′
1Aqˆ. (84)
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STEP 2: using Equations (81) and (84) the likelihood-ratio statistic (23) then equals
ξˆLR = max
λ
(
−1
4
λ′AΣˆA′λ + λ′Aqˆ
)
− max
λ:λ<0
(
−1
4
λ′AΣˆA′λ + λ′Aqˆ
)
= max
λ
[
qˆ′Σˆ−1qˆ −
(
1
2
ΣˆA′λ− qˆ
)′
Σˆ−1
(
1
2
ΣˆA′λ− qˆ
)]
−max
λ:λ<0
[
qˆ′Σˆ−1qˆ −
(
1
2
ΣˆA′λ− qˆ
)′
Σˆ−1
(
1
2
ΣˆA′λ− qˆ
)]
= min
λ:λ<0
[(
1
2
ΣˆA′λ− qˆ
)′
Σˆ−1
(
1
2
ΣˆA′λ− qˆ
)]
−min
λ
[(
1
2
ΣˆA′λ− qˆ
)′
Σˆ−1
(
1
2
ΣˆA′λ− qˆ
)]
= min
λ:λ<0
[(
1
2
ΣˆA′λ0 − 1
2
ΣˆA′λ
)′
Σˆ−1
(
1
2
ΣˆA′λ0 − 1
2
ΣˆA′λ
)]
,
where the last equality follows by a simple geometric argument. Combining the above
with Equations (79)− (80) then gives
ξˆLR = min
λ:λ<0
∥∥∥∥Σˆ−1/2 (qˆ − µ0)− 12Σˆ1/2A′λ
∥∥∥∥
2
,
where ‖X‖2 ≡ X ′X for any X ∈ Rk. Letting
Rˆ ≡ (AΣˆA′)−1AΣˆ1/2 and ν ≡ 1
2
Σˆ1/2A′λ
(so that λ = 2Rˆν) we then have
ξˆLR = min
ν:Rˆν<0
∥∥∥Σˆ−1/2 (qˆ − µ0)− ν∥∥∥2 . (85)
STEP3: we consider the dual of the minimization problem in (85):
max
β:β<0
[
−1
4
β′RˆRˆ′β − β ′RˆΣˆ−1/2(qˆ − µ0)
]
, (86)
where β is a (k − 1)-vector of Lagrange multipliers. Note that
− 1
4
β′RˆRˆ′β − β ′RˆΣˆ−1/2(qˆ − µ0)
=
∥∥∥(AΣˆA′)−1/2A(qˆ − µ0)∥∥∥2 −
∥∥∥∥12(AΣˆA′)−1/2β + (AΣˆA′)−1/2A(qˆ − µ0)
∥∥∥∥
2
,
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so the dual in Equation (86) is equivalent to
∥∥∥(AΣˆA′)−1/2A(qˆ − µ0)∥∥∥2 − min
β:β<0
∥∥∥∥12(AΣˆA′)−1/2β + (AΣˆA′)−1/2A(qˆ − µ0)
∥∥∥∥
2
. (87)
Now, let
Y ≡ −(AΣˆA′)−1/2A(qˆ − µ0) and γ ≡
1
2
(AΣˆA′)−1/2β (88)
(so β = 2(AΣˆA′)1/2γ); combining Equations (85)− (87) then yields
ξˆLR = ‖Y ‖2 − min
γ:(AΣˆA′)1/2γ<0
‖Y − γ‖2 . (89)
Let Yˆ denote the orthogonal projection of Y on the cone Cˆ,
Cˆ ≡
{
γ ∈ Rk−1 : (AΣˆA′)1/2γ < 0
}
;
hence
ξˆLR =
∥∥∥Yˆ ∥∥∥2 . (90)
STEP 4: Under the null hypothesis H0 we have Aµ = 0 (in addition to Aµ0 = 0) so
that
Y = B · V, where B ≡ −(AΣˆA′)−1/2AΣˆ1/2 and V ≡ Σˆ−1/2(qˆ − µ).
Under conditions of Corollary 6, the k-vector V is asymptotically distributed as V
d→
N (0k, Idk), and the (k − 1) × k-matrix B is such that BB ′ = Idk−1; hence as N → ∞,
the (k − 1)-vector Y is asymptotically distributed as
Y
d→ Z ≡ N (0k−1, Idk−1),
under the null hypothesis H0. Now, for every j, 1 6 j 6 k, let
σtj ≡
atj(qtj(αN))√
ctjN(1− αN)
,
and consider the matrix σ−2t1 (AΣˆA
′); its entries are
σ−2t1 (AΣˆA
′) =


σˆ2t1
σ2t1
+
σ2t2
σ2t1
σˆ2t2
σ2t2
−σ
2
t2
σ2t1
σˆ2t2
σ2t2
(0)
−σ
2
t2
σ2t1
σˆ2t2
σ2t2
σ2t2
σ2t1
σˆ2t2
σ2t2
+
σ2t3
σ2t1
σˆ2t3
σ2t3
−σ
2
t3
σ2t1
σˆ2t3
σ2t3
. . .
(0) −σ
2
tk−1
σ2t1
σˆ2tk−1
σ2tk−1
σ2tk−1
σ2t1
σˆ2tk−1
σ2tk−1
+
σ2tk
σ2t1
σˆ2tk
σ2tk


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From Lemma 4 and Theorem 5 we know that for every j, 1 6 j 6 k,
σˆ2tj
σ2tj
p→ 1.
Moreover, using Lemma 3(ii), and the fact that Hθ,t(·) does not depend on θ nor t, we
have
σtj
σt1
∼
(
ct1
ctj
)1/2 θ¯tj
θ¯t1
a(H¯−1(αN))
a(H¯−1(αN))
=
(
ct1
ctj
)1/2 θ¯tj
θ¯t1
,
so as N →∞ we have σ−2t1 (AΣˆA′)
p→ Ω with Ω being a symmetric (k−1)×(k−1)-matrix
Ω =


1 +
ct1 θ¯
2
t2
ct2 θ¯
2
t1
− ct1 θ¯
2
t2
ct2 θ¯
2
t1
(0)
− ct1 θ¯
2
t2
ct2 θ¯
2
t1
ct1 θ¯
2
t2
ct2 θ¯
2
t1
+
ct1 θ¯
2
t3
ct3 θ¯
2
t1
− ct1 θ¯
2
t3
ct3 θ¯
2
t1
. . .
− ct1 θ¯
2
tk−1
ctk−1 θ¯
2
t1
ct1 θ¯
2
tk−1
ctk−1 θ¯
2
t1
+
ct1 θ¯
2
tk
ctk θ¯
2
t1


(91)
Hence, using the fact that Cˆ can be written as Cˆ ≡
{
γ ∈ Rk−1 : σ−2t1 (AΣˆA′)1/2γ < 0
}
,
we have that the minimand in Equation (89) converges in probability to a well defined
limit; given its concavity, we know that
ξˆLR
p→ ξLR ≡ ‖Z‖2 − min
γ:Ω1/2γ<0
‖Z − γ‖2 =
∥∥∥Zˆ∥∥∥ , (92)
where Z ≡ N (0k−1, Idk−1), and Zˆ denotes the orthogonal projection of Z on the cone
C ≡ {γ ∈ Rk−1 : Ω1/2γ < 0} with Ω as defined in Equation (91).
STEP 5: In order to determine the distribution of ξLR in Equation (92) we use the
following lemma:
Lemma 14 ((Gourieroux, Holly, and Monfort, 1982)). Let Y be a standard normal
random vector of dimension p, i.e. Y ∼ N (0p, Idp) and let C be a nonsingular symmetric
(p× p)-matrix whose columns are denoted Cj, j = 1, ..., p. To each vector Cj, j = 1, ..., p,
we associate a vector C⊥j ∈ Rp such that: C⊥j is orthogonal to any Ci, i 6= j, and C ′jC⊥j <
0. For each subset S of the set {1, ..., p} we define the cone
CS ≡
{
y ∈ Rp : y =
p∑
i=1
αiAi, αi 6 0, i = 1, ..., p, Ai = Ci when i /∈ S and Ai = C⊥i when i ∈ S
}
.
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Consider the orthogonal projection of Y on the cone C(1,..,p), denoted Yˆ . Then the distri-
bution of
∥∥∥Yˆ ∥∥∥2 is a mixture of chi-square distributions
∥∥∥Yˆ ∥∥∥2 ∼ p∑
d=0
ω(d)χ2(d) with ω(d) =
∑
S:dim S=d
P{Yˆ ∈ CS},
where the sequence of weights ω(d), d = 0, ..., r satisfies ω(d) > 0 and
∑p
d=0 ω(d) = 1 and
χ2(0) denotes the point mass distribution at zero.
Let ωi, i = 1, ..., k−1 denote the columns of the (k−1)× (k−1)-matrix Ω1/2; to each
(k − 1)-vector ωi, i = 1, ..., k − 1, we associate a vector ϕi ∈ Rk−1 which is orthogonal to
any ωj, j 6= i, and is such that ω′iϕi < 0 (so ωi and ϕi are not in the same half-space
generated by the ωj’s with j 6= i). Then, using the notation from Lemma 14, we have
that C =
{
γ ∈ Rk−1 : γ = ∑k−1i=1 αiϕi, αi 6 0, i = 1, ..., k − 1} = C{1,...,k−1}. Combining
Lemma 14 with Equation (92) then yields the result of Theorem 7. Note that the entries
of Ω can be consistently estimated using σˆ−2t1 (AΣˆA
′); hence the probability weights ω(d)
can be consistently estimated by ωˆ(d), where ωˆ(d) are the weights obtained in the exact
Gaussian case.
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